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I. Introduction 
Copyright law continually struggles to keep up with 
technological advances.1 A combination of the often unpredictable 
pace of technological innovation, the reliably slow pace of 
lawmaking, and other factors leads to a delay in the legal response 
to copyright issues posed by new technology.2 These issues—
including those surrounding home video recording,3 MP3 files,4 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on 
Copyright, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1835–36 (2009) (“Because innovation is 
rapid and unpredictable, the adaptation of copyright law lags far behind the 
introduction of new technological advancements.”). 
 2. See id. at 1840–41 (listing as contributing factors “the creation of new 
legal rules takes time . . . [,] the dynamic and unpredictable nature of 
technological innovation[,] . . . the unpredictability of innovation [that] 
necessitates . . . open-ended standards in copyright law[, and] . . . ambiguity as 
to the potential social and economic implications of a novel technology”). 
 3. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 
(1984) (concluding that the private home use of Betamax recorders is a 
noninfringing fair use). 
 4. See UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (determining that defendant’s website, which allowed CD 
owners to obtain MP3 copies of their CDs, infringed on plaintiff record 
companies’ copyrights). 
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and peer-to-peer file sharing software5—are many times not 
resolved either by Congress or the courts until years after these 
technologies are first introduced.6  
Furthermore, unlike copyright cases in general, cases 
involving new technology call into question “not just the legality 
of certain uses of copyrighted works, but also, quite often, the 
legality of new technologies that can have a profound impact on 
innovation and the growth of the U.S. economy, as well as on 
people’s daily lives.”7 For example, the Supreme Court’s 1984 
decision Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.8 
saved the fledgling VCR industry—thereby enabling the home 
video industry to make billions for the very studios that had 
challenged the legality of VCRs9—but required a significant shift 
in copyright fair use doctrine to do so.10 With the advent of new 
technologies, copyright law not only must attempt to keep pace 
but must do so in a way that accounts for its impact on the 
technology at issue, industry, and daily life.11 
                                                                                                     
 5. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
936–37 (2005) (holding “that one who distributes a device with the object of 
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other 
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of 
infringement by third parties”). 
 6. See Depoorter, supra note 1, at 1843 (providing a table that lists 
technologies, the year they were introduced, the congressional or court action 
that resolved corresponding copyright issues, and the difference in years 
between the introduction of the technology and the year of the legal action). 
 7. Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 797 (2010). 
 8. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 9. See Lee, supra note 7, at 797 (describing how instead of dooming 
Hollywood studios, the VCR “facilitated the growth of a vast new and 
unforeseen market for the movie studios in the rental and sale of videos for 
home viewing, which, perhaps ironically, became ‘the largest source of revenue 
for the [U.S.] movie industry’” (alteration in original) (quoting Edward Lee, The 
Ethics of Innovation: P2P Software Developers and Designing Substantial 
Noninfringing Uses Under the Sony Doctrine, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 147, 148 
(2005))). 
 10. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (determining that the issue was whether 
“Betamax is capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses”). 
 11. See Depoorter, supra note 1, at 1842 (describing how until the effects of 
the new technology on the market are known, “both copyright owners and users 
of new technologies operate in a vacuum of considerable legal uncertainty”). 
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Three-dimensional (3D) printing has been called the next 
disruptive technology to conflict with copyright law.12 This 
technology, which allows people in their own homes to reproduce 
any 3D object, “eventually promises to democratize creation.”13 
Although 3D printing is now generally the province of industry14 
and hobbyists,15 it is only a matter of time before it becomes 
ubiquitous, given that 3D printer prices continue to fall.16 And 
while no one has filed a lawsuit yet,17 parties have fired opening 
salvos. Copyright holders have issued takedown notices per the 
                                                                                                     
 12. See Peter Hanna, The Next Napster? Copyright Questions as 3D 
Printing Comes of Age, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 6, 2011, 12:35 AM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/04/the-next-napster-copyright-questions-
as-3d-printing-comes-of-age/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“Though still in its 
infancy, personal 3D printing technology already shows the same disruptive 
potential as the original printing press. . . . And it’s precisely because of its 
potential as a game changer that 3D printing presents challenging legal 
questions best addressed before the technology becomes ubiquitous.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Chris Morrison, What Works: 3-D Printing for the Rest of Us, 
CNNMONEY (Aug. 22, 2007, 9:29 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/ 
08/21/technology/3d_printing.biz2/index.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) 
(explaining how companies such as Logitech and Boeing use 3D printers to 
quickly create testable prototypes and how manufacturers use 3D printers to 
create spare parts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 15. See Hanna, supra note 12 (“3D printing today remains a hobbyist-
driven enterprise with a high barrier to entry.”). 
 16. See HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, FABRICATED: THE NEW WORLD OF 3D 
PRINTING 39 (2013) (explaining that when someone develops a “killer app”—
Facebook, Angry Birds, etc.—consumers will be compelled to purchase 3D 
printers). Compare Morrison, supra note 14 (noting that 3D printers in 1997 
were used almost exclusively by major manufacturing companies for prototypes 
and cost $120,000, while by 2007, similar machines cost $50,000), with Andy 
Greenberg, Inside Thingiverse, the Radically Open Website Powering the 3D 
Printing Movement, FORBES (Nov. 21, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/andygreenberg/2012/11/21/inside-thingiverse-the-radically-open-website-
powering-the-3d-printing-movement/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“In September 
the Brooklyn, N.Y. firm Makerbot started selling the $2,200 Replicator 2, its 
latest and most polished 3-D printer . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 17. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (“The site has already had to remove 
several designs after receiving takedown notices under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act. . . . Thingiverse has yet to face an intellectual property lawsuit 
over the infringing content its users upload, like the $1 billion tort that Viacom 
threw at Google’s YouTube service in 2007.”). 
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Digital Millennium Copyright Act18 (DMCA) to websites that 
allow users to download 3D computer-aided design (CAD) files.19 
Moreover, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office recently issued 
a patent for a 3D printing digital rights management method, 
similar to those used by Apple and by Barnes & Noble’s Nook, 
which would prevent 3D printers from using pirated CAD files.20 
As 3D printing becomes more widespread, however, copyright 
owners who until now have looked the other way will be more 
likely to take action.21 3D printing will either exploit a sufficient 
portion of the market,22 or it will affect the works of specific 
copyright owners who will take exception to the 3D printing of 
their works.23  
3D printing will pose a number of novel challenges for courts 
in copyright cases. First, as individual authors and companies try 
to claim copyright over CAD files, “[t]he line between a physical 
object and a digital description of a physical object may . . . begin 
to blur. With a 3D printer, having the bits [will be] almost as 
good as having the atoms.”24 In addition, there are numerous 
                                                                                                     
 18. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–05, 1301–32 
(2012). 
 19. See infra notes 36–47 and accompanying text (explaining what CAD 
files are and how they work).  
 20. See Antonio Regalado, Nathan Myhrvold’s Cunning Plan to Prevent 3-D 
Printer Piracy, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.technologyreview. 
com/view/429566/nathan-myhrvolds-cunning-plan-to-prevent-3-d-printer-piracy/ 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“The patent basically covers the idea of digital rights 
management, or DRM, for 3-D printers. Like with e-books that won’t open 
unless you pay Barnes & Noble and use its Nook reader, with Myhrvold’s 
technology your printer wouldn’t print unless you’ve paid up.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 21. See Hanna, supra note 12 (“If the current 3D printing free-for-all 
sounds too good to last, it is. The community today is small and has avoided, 
either by chance or design, stepping on any really big toes . . . .”). 
 22. See id. (comparing 3D printing to home video recording before Sony 
introduced Betamax, which studios feared would cut into their home video and 
box office profits). 
 23. See id. (comparing 3D printing to Napster before Metallica complained 
about one of its demos surfacing on the p2p site). 
 24. Michael Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome if They Don’t Screw It Up: 3D 
Printing, Intellectual Property, and the Fight over the Next Great Disruptive 
Technology, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 2010), http://publicknowledge.org/it-will-be-
awesome-if-they-dont-screw-it-up (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter 
Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
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relationships to consider between copyrighted works, CAD files, 
and 3D-printed objects.25 For example, an individual can create a 
CAD file of an entirely original design or a design that is 
potentially protected by a copyright on an existing work.26 
Although sometimes independent designers create CAD files of 
existing works,27 in other cases, the copyright owner or a licensee 
creates the CAD file.28 The result is a complex web of 
relationships between works. The copyrightability of a CAD file 
might depend on whether the object depicted was copyrightable.29 
                                                                                                     
Review); see also LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 16, at 23 (“Scanning technology 
and 3D printing will together introduce high resolution shapeshifting between 
the physical and digital worlds.”). Lipson and Kurman also highlight that sales 
revenue for mid- and small-sized non-industrial 3D printers increased 40% 
between 2010 and 2011. Id. at 40. But see id. at 39–40 (quoting analyst Terry 
Wohlers as speculating that consumers will rely on services such as Shapeways 
or Amazon instead of purchasing their own printers).  
 25. See Michael Weinberg, What’s the Deal with Copyright and 3D 
Printing?, PUB. KNOWLEDGE 8 (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.publicknowledge. 
org/files/What’s%20the%20Deal%20with%20Copyright_%20Final%20version2.p
df [hereinafter Weinberg, What’s the Deal?] (“However, as the Penrose triangle 
story suggests, the intersection of 3D printing and copyright is often not a clean 
one, and the situation tends to get complicated quickly.”). The “Penrose triangle 
story” refers to the story of Dr. Ulrich Schwanitz, who posted a CAD file of a 
well-known optical illusion online. Id. at 6–7. Thingiverse users subsequently 
posted similar files, which were presumably downloaded and printed. Id. 
 26. Compare The Wired 3D Print-off, WIRED, http://www.wired.com/ 
design/2013/01/3-d-print-off/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (publishing examples of 
“original, printable” designs for a contest such as “a heart [pendant] created by 
365 smaller hearts,” “a three legged robot with a mini cannon,” and “a 
Christmas ornament of a snowflake trapped within an intricate hollow star 
cage”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), with Greenberg, 
supra note 16 (“[T]he site turns up plenty of potentially trademarked or 
copyrighted designs, like an Iron Man helmet or figurines from Star Wars and 
the videogame Doom.”).  
 27. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (implying that the designers of CAD files 
depicting Iron Man or Star Wars characters did not have the copyright owners’ 
permission to create the files). 
 28. See Mike Senese, Nokia Releases Files for 3-D Printing Your Own 
Phone Case, WIRED (Jan. 18, 2013, 5:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/design/ 
2013/01/nokia-3d-print-case/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“Nokia has opened its 
arms to 3-D printing with the release of printable design files and instructions 
for making your own Nokia phone case.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 29. See Weinberg, What’s the Deal?, supra note 25, at 7 (“Although the 
story ends well, there is a gaping hole at the center of it: the entire narrative 
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The outcomes of derivative works and fair use issues might 
depend on whether the potentially infringing work is a CAD file 
or a 3D-printed object, or whether the protected work is a CAD 
file or a preexisting copyrighted object. Courts will have to sort 
through these ancillary matters in order to determine the 
outcomes of infringement actions. 
This Note seeks to untangle the component issues of the 
network of relationships unique to 3D printing. First, it addresses 
whether CAD files, insofar as they contain both design drawing 
and computer code elements and exist for the distinct purpose of 
3D printing, are copyrightable. Second, in light of the issue of 
copyrightability, it examines whether CAD files and 3D-printed 
objects are independently copyrightable as derivative works, and 
whether they infringe on authors’ derivative works rights. 
Finally, it questions whether current fair use doctrine, as an 
affirmative defense for otherwise infringing works, can 
adequately account for 3D printing as an emerging technology. 
After explaining how 3D printing and CAD files work in Part 
II, this Note provides the legal background for copyrightability, 
derivative works, and fair use in Parts III, IV, and V, 
respectively. In Part VI.A, this Note explains why CAD files fail 
to fit within any current category of copyrightable works. As a 
solution, it poses a new test that considers a CAD file’s drawing 
and code components separately before determining whether 
otherwise copyrightable expression has merged with the CAD 
file’s functional purpose. With this test in mind, Part VI.B 
examines the derivative works issues. Finally, in Part VI.C, this 
Note argues that the established fair use doctrine will fail to 
provide predictable outcomes in 3D printing cases that are 
consistent with the goals of fair use and copyright generally. 
Rather, 3D printing poses unique challenges that demonstrate 
the need to adopt Professor Edward Lee’s technological fair use 
standard as a separate test that can account for the potential 
benefits of and harm to emerging technologies. 
                                                                                                     
assumes that Schwanitz has a copyright in his design that was copied in the 
first place.”). 
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II. An Explanation of 3D Printing and CAD Files 
To examine the copyright issues pertaining to 3D printing, 
one must first understand 3D printers, CAD files, and the 
relationship between the two. 3D printers operate in a similar 
manner to inkjet printers except that, instead of printing on a 
two-dimensional piece of paper, 3D printers build up a 3D object 
by printing tiny layers of plastic, metal, ceramics, or other 
materials on top of each other.30 These printers are capable of 
producing—among other things—machine parts,31 architectural 
models,32 board games,33 and even (when cellular material is used 
in the printer) human tissue.34 Assuming that the 3D printer is 
large enough, it can print objects of any size.35  
                                                                                                     
 30. See LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 16, at 68, 73 (describing two types of 
3D printers: those that “squirt, squeeze, or spray” materials (most consumer 
models); and those that use lasers to “fuse, bind, or glue” powdered materials 
together); id. at 82 (“[M]ost companies and printing hobbyists must content 
themselves with plastic, metals, ceramics, edible semi-solid foodstuffs, and to a 
lesser extent concrete or glass.”); Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome, supra note 24 
(“Instead of taking a block of material and cutting away until it produces a solid 
object, a 3D printer actually builds the object up from tiny bits of material, layer 
by layer.”). 
 31. See Morrison, supra note 14 (“[H]e pulls out a perfectly turned machine 
part—a plastic housing that slides neatly into place . . . .”). 
 32. See id. (discussing how one family business “toyed with several ideas—
jewelry making, medical printing—before settling on architectural modeling”). 
 33. See Joseph Flaherty, Watch Your Back, Hasbro, 3-D Printed Games 
Have Arrived, WIRED (Aug. 30, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/ 
design/2012/08/watch-your-back-hasbro-3d-printed-games-have-arrived/ (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“3D printers are sometimes called Santa Claus machines 
because, like Santa, they can create anything imaginable. . . . The team at Ill 
Gotten Games is doing just that by creating Pocket Tactics, the first open source 
miniatures game designed to be manufactured on a 3D printer.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 34. See Biological Tissues from a Printer, GEN NEWS HIGHLIGHTS (Sept. 14, 
2012), http://www.genengnews.com/gen-news-highlights/biological-tissues-from-
a-printer/81247319/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“[T]he new technique . . . 
effectively allows complex nanostructures such as blood vessels or potentially 
new heart tissue, for example, to be printed out of biocompatible materials in 
just seconds.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 35. See Hanna, supra note 12 (“The size of these shapes is only limited by 
the size of the printer making them.”). 
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3D printers operate from virtual 3D models called CAD 
files.36 CAD files are saved in .amf format37 or the older and more 
widely used .stl format—“the object equivalent of a .pdf file—they 
are more or less universally printable by 3D printers and allow 
objects to be transferred digitally around the world.”38 The files 
are either rendered by a designer on a computer software 
program or created using a 3D scanner.39 “Much as a word 
processor is superior to a typewriter because it allows a writer to 
add, delete, and edit text freely, a CAD program [as opposed to a 
physical prototype] allows a designer to manipulate a design as 
she sees fit.”40 There are two types of design software. First, “solid 
modeling” software offers users a library of ready-made shapes 
“that can be cut stretched, and combined with a few clicks of a 
mouse.”41 Second, “surface modeling” software allows users to 
construct 3D objects freehand by “digitally ‘wrapping’ shapes in a 
virtual fishing net” to map the objects in space.42 On the other 
hand, 3D scanners “capture physical dimensions of things . . . as 
                                                                                                     
 36. See Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome, supra note 24 (explaining how CAD 
files work). 
 37. See LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 16, at 101–02 (describing .amf files 
as a “new XML-based standard”).  
 38. Weinberg, What’s the Deal?, supra note 25, at 14. Lipson and Kurman 
argue that the .stl format cannot handle the volume of information in modern 
CAD files, but that until 3D-printing vendors adopt the .amf format, “we’re 
stuck . . . [with] the old but tired warhorse STL.” LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 
16, at 102. 
 39. See Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome, supra note 24 (“3D printing starts 
with a blueprint, usually one created with a computer aided design (CAD) 
program running on a desktop computer. This is a virtual 3D model of an 
object. . . . A designer uses the CAD program to create the model, which is then 
saved as a file.”); As 3-D Printing Becomes More Accessible, Copyright Questions 
Arise, KUNC 91.5 (Feb. 19, 2013, 2:13 PM), http://www.kunc.org/post/3-d-
printing-becomes-more-accessible-copyright-questions-arise (last visited Jan. 31, 
2014) (describing how companies have created software that turns the Kinect 
for Microsoft’s Xbox 360 into a 3D scanner capable of “collect[ing] 3-D data and 
images, and . . . stitch[ing] everything together into a detailed 3-D model”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 40. Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome, supra note 24. 
 41. LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 16, at 92. “Solid modeling was born from 
industrial design and manufacturing.” Id. at 93. 
 42. Id. at 94. “If solid modeling grew up among engineers, surface modeling 
design software grew up in the midst of animators and illustrators.” Id.  
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a surface coating of digital confetti [in which e]ach piece of digital 
confetti represents a data point . . . documented as a set of x, y, 
and z coordinates.”43 
To print a 3D object, the CAD software “deconstructs the 
image into a series of 2D cross-sectional slices”44 and sends them 
through computer code to the 3D printer.45 The printer then 
deposits the material layer by layer.46 Software that is available 
on the Internet enables individuals with any level of CAD 
modeling experience to create their own designs, with some 
programs including a variety of drawing tools and others 
supplying a library of premade shapes.47 
Websites make CAD files available to the public for 
download.48 Some such sites charge users to download files.49 
Others, however, allow “users to freely upload, improve upon, and 
distribute virtually any designs at all.”50 The website 
Thingiverse, for example, makes 25,000 CAD files available for 
free.51 These files often depict copyrighted works, whether they 
are “distinctive designer items” or Darth Vader heads.52 As a step 
                                                                                                     
 43. Id. at 96. 
 44. Hanna, supra note 12. 
 45. See Thomas Olson, Technology Takes Printing to Whole Different 
Dimension, PITT. TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2013, 9:23 PM), http://triblive.com/news/ 
adminpage/3265615-74/printing-greene-pittsburgh#axzz2JhO6mvSH (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“The 3-D printing process starts with a computer file of 
code that describes an object’s dimensions and properties.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). For examples of .stl file code, see The STL 
Format: Standard Data Format for Fabbers, FABBER.COM, http://www. 
ennex.com/~fabbers/StL.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 46. See Hanna, supra note 12 (“The printer deposits layers of material, 
typically plastic or metal, one atop the other in the shape of each 2D slice.”). 
 47. See The Wired 3D Print-Off, supra note 26 (providing links to CAD 
modeling software and sites including Tinkercad, Shapeways Creator, Autodesk 
123D Design, and Sketchup). 
 48. See Hanna, supra note 12 (“Two models have emerged for websites that 
distribute and/or fabricate 3D designs.”). 
 49. See id. (describing the “money model” typified by Shapeways). 
 50. Id. (describing the “open model” typified by Thingiverse). 
 51. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (“Anyone who buys a Makerbot can 
immediately download and print any of Thingiverse’s 25,000 designs.”). 
 52. See Hanna, supra note 12 (discussing the types of items for which CAD 
files are available on Shapeways and Thingiverse, respectively). 
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to prevent future lawsuits after receiving its first DMCA 
takedown notice,53 Thingiverse posted online its Intellectual 
Property Policy, which “provides for the removal of any infringing 
or unauthorized materials and for the termination, in appropriate 
circumstances, of users of our online Site and Services who are 
repeat infringers of intellectual property rights or who repeatedly 
submit unauthorized content.”54 But while websites such as 
Thingiverse may attempt to limit their liability,55 copyright suits 
almost inevitably loom in the near future for these sites, 
individual CAD designers, and users of 3D printers.56 
                                                                                                     
 53. See Brian Rideout, Note, Printing the Impossible Triangle: The 
Copyright Implications of Three-Dimensional Printing, 5 J. BUS., 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 161, 165–66 (2011) (recounting the first DMCA 
takedown notice for 3D printing in February 2011, which Ulrich Schwanitz 
issued when another designer posted a CAD file of his Penrose Triangle model 
on the open website, Thingiverse). 
 54. Intellectual Property Policy, THINGIVERSE, http://www.thingiverse. 
com/legal/ip-policy (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); see also Thingiverse Blog, Copyright Policy, THINGIVERSE (Feb. 
18, 2011), http://blog.thingiverse.com/2011/02/18/copyright-and-intellectual-prop 
erty-policy/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (explaining that on the day after 
Schwanitz issued his takedown notice, Thingiverse “updated [its] legal page 
with a new DMCA specific policy”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Thingiverse’s Terms of Use also require a user to select either a 
“Creative Commons License” or an “All Rights Reserved” license for any content 
that she uploads onto the site. Terms of Use, THINGIVERSE, 
http://www.thingiverse.com/legal (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). In addition, the user agrees “not to use the 
Site or Services to collect, upload, transmit, display, or distribute any User 
Content . . . that violates any third-party right, including any copyright, 
trademark, patent, trade secret, moral right, privacy right, right of publicity, or 
any other intellectual property or proprietary right.” Id. 
 55. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2012) (providing safe harbor from 
contributory infringement for websites that do not “have actual knowledge that 
the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is 
infringing” and “upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove or disable access to, the material”). 
 56. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text (explaining how it is only 
a matter of time before a copyright holder commences an action related to 3D 
printing). 
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III. Legal Requirements of and Limitations on Copyrightability 
The Supreme Court has asserted that “[t]o establish 
[copyright] infringement, two elements must be proven: 
(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent 
elements of the work that are original.”57 Thus, in any 
infringement case concerning 3D printing or otherwise, courts 
will first have to determine whether the plaintiff owns a valid 
copyright. This Part explains the legal requirements of and 
limitations on copyrightability. 
A. Original Works Fixed in a Tangible Medium of Expression 
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 197658 defines 
copyrightable subject matter. Under this section, copyright 
protection extends to “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.”59 Copyrightability can therefore be broken into two 
components: a work must be “original” and “fixed in any tangible 
medium.”60  
1. Originality 
Originality consists of “independent creation” and a 
“modicum of creativity.”61 Independent creation does not require 
novelty, and “a work may be original even though it closely 
resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not 
the result of copying.”62 In other words, if two authors 
independently—and ignorant of each other—created the exact 
                                                                                                     
 57. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
 58. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. 
 62. Id. at 345. 
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same work, both would satisfy the originality requirement.63 
When compared to a previously existing work, the work in 
question is original if “the ‘author’ contributed something more 
than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, something recognizably ‘his 
own.’”64 The creativity requirement is a similarly low threshold.65 
Almost any work possesses “some creative spark ‘no matter how 
crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”66 Some works, such as 
those containing mere facts, however, fail the creativity prong.67 
2. Fixed in a Tangible Medium of Expression 
Works must not only be original to be copyrightable; they 
must also be fixed in a tangible medium of expression.68 
Although the Constitution authorizes Congress to “secur[e] for 
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings,”69 courts have historically interpreted 
“writings” broadly.70 As noted above, Congress has since codified 
the courts’ approach, extending protection to works “fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”71 As a nonexaustive list of 
                                                                                                     
 63. See id. at 345–46 (“To illustrate, assume that two poets, each ignorant 
of the other, compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are 
original and, hence, copyrightable.” (citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures 
Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936))). 
 64. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 
1951). 
 65. See id. (“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; 
even a slight amount will suffice.”). 
 66. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (quoting 1 M. 
NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 201(A), (B) (1990)). 
 67. See id. at 347 (explaining that facts “do not owe their origin to an act of 
authorship” and are therefore unoriginal discoveries rather than creations). 
 68. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (stating the § 102(a) 
requirement). 
 69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 70. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (explaining how 
courts have interpreted the term “writings . . . to include any physical rendering 
of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor” (citing Trade-Mark Cases, 
100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879))), superseded by statute on other grounds, Copyright Act 
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2572 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101–805 (2012)). 
 71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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examples,72 the statute specifically declares copyright-eligible 
“(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any 
accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any 
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures 
and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and 
(8) architectural works.”73 
B. Limits on Copyrightability 
Although § 102(a) sets a relatively low originality threshold 
for copyrightability,74 the Copyright Act does provide limits on 
what is protected. Under § 102(b), copyright protection does not 
extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form 
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in 
such work.”75 Just as courts have had to separate 
noncopyrightable facts from the potentially copyrightable 
compilation of those facts,76 so too have courts struggled with the 
idea–expression dichotomy—the difference between 
noncopyrightable ideas and the expression of those ideas.77 
Furthermore, copyrightability, insofar as it protects expression, 
does not extend to useful articles—or the functional aspects—of a 
work.78 
                                                                                                     
 72. See id. (“Works of authorship include the following categories . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See supra Part III.A.1 (explaining that the “independent creation” and 
“modicum of creativity” requirements for originality are easily met).  
 75. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 76. See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 344–51 (1991) 
(discussing how compilations of facts, rather than the facts themselves, can be 
copyrightable when “choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are 
made independently by the compiler[,] . . . entail a minimal degree of 
creativity”). 
 77. See id. at 349–50 (“To this end, copyright assures authors the right to 
their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas 
and information conveyed by a work. This principle, known as the 
idea/expression . . . dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship.”). 
 78. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 
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1. The Idea–Expression Dichotomy and Merger 
The basis for the idea–expression dichotomy comes from 
§ 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976, which states that “[i]n no 
case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea . . . regardless of the form in which it is 
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”79 
Thus, “[u]nlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to 
the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the 
idea—not the idea itself.”80 The Supreme Court first articulated 
the concept of the idea–expression dichotomy in Baker v. 
Selden,81 stating that  
[T]here is a clear distinction between the book, as such, and 
the art which it is intended to illustrate. The mere statement 
of the proposition is so evident, that it requires hardly any 
argument to support it. The same distinction may be 
predicated of every other art as well as that of book-keeping. A 
treatise on the composition and use of medicines, be they old 
or new; on the construction and use of ploughs, or watches, or 
churns; or on the mixture and application of colors for painting 
or dyeing; or on the mode of drawing lines to produce the effect 
of perspective,—would be the subject of copyright; but no one 
would contend that the copyright of the treatise would give the 
exclusive right to the art or manufacture described therein.82 
                                                                                                     
(2d Cir. 1987) (explaining how Congress attempted to draw a clear line between 
copyrightable pictorial and sculptural works, on the one hand, and 
noncopyrightable elements of design, on the other). 
 79. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
 80. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954), superseded on other grounds 
by federal regulation, 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1959).  
 81. 101 U.S. 99 (1880). In Baker, the plaintiff published a book describing 
an accounting system that he had invented. Id. at 99–100. When the defendant 
used the plaintiff’s system without his permission, the plaintiff sued for 
copyright infringement. Id. at 100. As the Court noted, “[i]f the complainant’s 
testator had the exclusive right to the use of the system explained in his book, it 
would be difficult to contend that the defendant does not infringe it.” Id. But, 
the Court explained, the plaintiff’s copyright lay in the book only as an 
explanatory work; he could not claim copyright over the system itself. See id. 
(“[I]t seems to be equally difficult to contend that the books made and sold by 
the defendant are a violation of the copyright of the complainant’s book 
considered merely as a book explanatory of the system.”). 
 82. Id. at 102. 
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For the Court, the distinction between idea and expression 
marked the line between patent and copyright.83 The question of 
ownership of an idea hinged on novelty—a patent concept—
whereas an author’s book was copyrightable even if it described 
an idea thousands of years old.84 Thus, “expression” in this 
context can be better understood as the means of expression.85 
The idea–expression dichotomy presents a number of 
problems, including the doctrine of merger. The doctrine of 
merger states that “[w]hen there is essentially only one way to 
express an idea, the idea and its expression are inseparable and 
copyright is no bar to copying that expression.”86 When the 
expression becomes essential to the idea itself, the two effectively 
“merge,” rendering the expression noncopyrightable.87 Thus, as 
the Supreme Court noted in Baker, copyright protection extends 
only to those expressions that are not “necessary incidents” to the 
idea.88 
For example, in the context of computer software, a number 
of concerns can limit an author’s choices of expression until only a 
single means of expression is possible.89 Software copyrights, 
                                                                                                     
 83. See id. (“To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the 
art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially 
made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of 
letters-patent, not of copyright.”). 
 84. See id. (“The copyright of the book, if not pirated from other works, 
would be valid without regard to the novelty, or want of novelty, of its subject-
matter. The novelty of the art or thing described or explained has nothing to do 
with the validity of the copyright.”). 
 85. See Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, 10 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (1995) (“In particular, a copyright owner may not lay claim 
to the ideas within her work, but only to her particular means of expressing 
those ideas.”). 
 86. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 
(1st Cir. 1988). 
 87. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 
1992) (“Under these circumstances, the expression is said to have ‘merged’ with 
the idea itself. In order not to confer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright 
owner, such expression should not be protected.”). 
 88. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880). 
 89. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 709–10 (“[A] programmer’s freedom of design 
choice is often circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as . . . 
(1) mechanical specifications of the computer . . . ; (2) compatibility 
requirements of other programs . . . ; (3) computer manufacturers’ design 
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which serve a largely utilitarian function, face specific problems 
because almost all “expression” in the code or structure of the 
program is incidental to the purpose of the program.90 In an 
attempt to formulate a bright-line rule to account for the idea–
expression dichotomy, the Third Circuit determined in Whelan 
Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.91 that “the 
purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work’s 
idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or 
function would be part of the expression of the idea.”92 Under 
Whelan, then, anything that survives a merger inquiry is 
copyrightable expression.93 Later decisions, however, determined 
that lack of merger alone is not sufficient to constitute 
copyrightability. Rather, courts must also account for whether 
elements were dictated by external factors,94 and they must 
determine whether certain aspects were noncopyrightable 
under § 102(b).95 
                                                                                                     
standards; (4) demands of the industry being serviced; and (5) . . . programming 
practices within the computer industry.”). 
 90. See Lemley, supra note 85, at 7 (“[C]omputer programs are written for 
a utilitarian purpose. Expression in the code or structure and organization of a 
program is normally only incidental to that purpose.”). 
 91. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 92. Id. at 1236 (emphasis omitted). 
 93. See id. (“Where there are various means of achieving the desired 
purpose, then the particular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; 
hence, there is expression, not idea.”). 
 94. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–10 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (employing an “abstraction–filtration–comparison” test in which the 
court, during the filtration step, determines whether any of the potentially 
infringed expression is necessitated by efficiency (essentially a merger inquiry), 
necessitated by external elements such as constraints on hardware, or taken 
from the public domain). 
 95. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 49 F.3d 807, 814 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(determining that the court need not apply the Altai test if the menu tree at 
issue was a noncopyrightable method of operation from the start).  
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2. The Useful Article Doctrine 
Another limitation on copyrightability that has posed 
problems for the courts is the useful article doctrine. The doctrine 
essentially states that  
the design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work [which is copyright-eligible under 
§ 102(a)] only if, and only to the extent that, such design 
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can 
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.96 
While pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works as defined by 
§ 10197 are eligible for copyright protection under § 102(a),98 any 
mechanical or utilitarian aspects of the work are not.99 Section 
101 defines “useful article” as an “article having an intrinsic 
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance 
of the article or to convey information.”100 The useful article 
doctrine seeks to draw a line between copyrightable works of art 
and noncopyrightable works of industrial design.101 Although the 
useful article doctrine is like the idea–expression dichotomy in its 
attempt to create a boundary between copyrightable and 
noncopyrightable subject matter, the idea–expression dichotomy 
applies to all works of authorship,102 while the useful article 
                                                                                                     
 96. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 97. See id. (“‘Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ include two-
dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, 
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, 
models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans.”). 
 98. See id. § 102(a) (“Works of authorship include . . . pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works . . . .”).  
 99. See id. § 101 (“Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship 
insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are 
concerned.”). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) (“In adopting this amendatory 
language, the Committee is seeking to draw as clear a line as possible between 
copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrighted works of industrial 
design.”). 
 102. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (providing that an idea is not 
copyrightable “regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied”). 
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doctrine applies only to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works.103 Furthermore, because expression survives the doctrine 
of merger if it is not incidental to the idea that it expresses,104 
certain copyrightable elements of an article can survive the 
useful article doctrine.105 
The challenge for the courts has been to devise a standard by 
which copyrightable elements can be separated from useful 
articles.106 Courts have drawn on language in the legislative 
history of the Copyright Act of 1976 to develop two theories of 
separability: physical separability and conceptual separability.107 
For an element to be physically separable it must be “capable of 
existing as a work of art independent of the utilitarian article 
into which [it was] incorporated.”108 It must be “a ‘feature’ 
segregable from the overall shape” of the useful article.109 On the 
other hand, conceptual separability requires that elements, 
regardless of whether they possess aesthetic features, can be 
“conceptualized as existing independently of their utilitarian 
function.”110 Courts, however, have struggled to determine what 
constitutes a conception of independent existence.111 
Three distinct tests have emerged for determining whether 
features of a work are conceptually separable from the useful 
                                                                                                     
 103. See id. § 101 (defining “useful article” in terms of pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works). 
 104. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing how expression 
not incidental to the idea is copyrightable). 
 105. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) (“[O]nly elements, if any, which 
can be identified separately from the useful article as such are copyrightable.”). 
 106. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1142 
(2d Cir. 1987) (“The courts, however, have had difficulty framing tests by which 
the fine line establishing what is and what is not copyrightable can be drawn.”). 
 107. See id. at 1143 (“One aspect of the distinction that has drawn 
considerable attention is the reference in the House Report to ‘physically or 
conceptually’ . . . separable elements.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 
(1976))). 
 108. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 109. Id. at 805. 
 110. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 
1985). 
 111. See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1144 (“The problem, however, is determining 
exactly what it is and how it is to be applied.”). 
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article.112 First, Judge Newman’s dissent in Carol Barnhart, Inc. 
v. Economy Cover Corp.113 proposed a “temporal displacement 
test” for conceptual separability.114 Under the temporal 
displacement test, which William Patry supports in his 
treatise,115 an artistic element is separable from the useful article 
if “the design creates in the mind of the ordinary observer two 
different concepts that are not inevitably entertained 
simultaneously.”116 Rather than merely evoking in the observer a 
concept separate from utilitarian function,117 the “design [must] 
                                                                                                     
 112. See id. at 1144–45 (considering Judge Newman’s “temporal 
displacement test” from Barnhart and Professor Denicola’s test); 1 PAUL 
GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.5.3.1 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter 
GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT] (providing a third test dependent on traditional 
conceptions of art). Professor Goldstein actually identifies five tests for 
conceptual separability besides his own, but considers the tests “overlapping.” 
Id. By narrowing the list to three, this Note touches on those tests that consider 
distinct criteria. 
 113. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). Barnhart concerned the copyrightability of 
torso mannequins. Id. at 412. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling that 
the mannequins were useful articles, and that artistic elements could not be 
physically or conceptually separated. Id. at 419. While the majority relied 
almost entirely on legislative history, however, to settle the question of 
conceptual separability, Judge Newman’s dissent advocated for a new temporal 
displacement test. See id. at 418 (“The legislative history thus confirms that, 
while copyright protection has increasingly been extended to cover articles 
having a utilitarian dimension, Congress has explicitly refused copyright 
protection for works of applied art or industrial design which have aesthetic or 
artistic features that cannot be identified separately from the useful article.”); 
id. at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“I think the requisite ‘separateness’ exists 
whenever the design creates in the mind of the ordinary observer two different 
concepts that are not inevitably entertained simultaneously.”). 
 114. See id. at 422–24 (explaining the test); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade 
Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1144 (2d Cir. 1987) (referring to the test as the 
“temporal displacement” test).  
 115. See 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:141 (2006) (preferring 
the temporal displacement test to the Denicola test from Brandir).  
 116. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422. 
 117. See id. at 423 (“Some might think that the requisite separability of 
concepts exists whenever the design of a form engenders in the mind of the 
ordinary observer any concept that is distinct from the concept of the form’s 
utilitarian function.”). Such an understanding of conceptual separability would 
allow for copyrightability of merely aesthetically pleasing articles—protection 
that Congress specifically intended not to extend. See id. (“That approach, I fear, 
would subvert the Congressional effort to deny copyright protection to designs of 
useful articles that are aesthetically pleasing.”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 
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engender[] a non-utilitarian concept without at the same time 
engendering the concept of a utilitarian function.”118  
The majority in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific 
Lumber Co.119 rejected the temporal displacement test in favor of 
a standard that Professor Denicola articulated in Applied Art and 
Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful 
Articles.120 Professor Denicola suggested that there is not a bright 
line between creative works and useful articles, but rather “a 
spectrum of forms and shapes responsive in varying degrees to 
utilitarian concerns.”121 The Brandir court interpreted Professor 
Denicola’s test to mean that “if design elements reflect a merger 
of aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a 
work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the 
utilitarian elements. Conversely, where design elements can be 
identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised 
independently of functional influences, conceptual separability 
exists.”122 
Finally, in Goldstein on Copyright, Professor Paul Goldstein 
presents a test that incorporates traditional notions of art and a 
concept similar to the physical separability test from Esquire, Inc. 
v. Ringer.123 Professor Goldstein’s test posits that a useful article 
                                                                                                     
(1976) (“On the other hand, although the shape of an industrial product may be 
aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee’s intention is not to offer it 
copyright protection under the bill.”). 
 118. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 423 (2d Cir. 
1985) (Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 119. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). Brandir concerned the copyrightability of 
the now common “RIBBON Rack” bicycle rack, which David Levine based on his 
wire sculptures “formed from one continuous undulating piece of wire.” Id. at 
1146. The court adopted Professor Denicola’s test and determined that the rack 
was sufficiently influenced by utilitarian concerns to be not conceptually 
separable, and therefore not copyrightable. Id. at 1146–47. 
 120. See Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested 
Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 741–47 (1983) 
(expressing dissatisfaction with Mazer and Esquire and establishing a more 
flexible test). 
 121. Id. at 741. 
 122. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145. 
 123. Compare Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(explaining that for an element to be physically separable it must be “capable of 
existing as a work of art independent of the utilitarian article into which they 
were incorporated”), with GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 112, § 2.5.3.1 
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is conceptually separable “if it can stand on its own as a work of 
art traditionally conceived, and if the useful article in which it is 
embodied would be equally useful without it.”124 Essentially, the 
Goldstein test is a reformulation of the physical separability test, 
except that the act of separation becomes a mental exercise 
instead of an inquiry into whether the artistic and functional 
elements can literally be pulled apart.125  
While the statutory requirements of originality and fixation 
are not particularly stringent,126 the limitations posed by the 
idea–expression dichotomy and the useful article doctrine help to 
draw a clearer line between copyrightable and noncopyrightable 
subject matter. Copyrightability issues pertaining to 3D printing 
must therefore focus on both the originality and fixation 
requirements and these limitations.127 
IV. Derivative Works 
Once the issue of copyrightability is settled, the issue of 
derivative works arises. Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act of 
1976 gives the author of a copyrighted work “exclusive rights . . . 
to prepare derivative works.”128 In terms of 3D printing, it will be 
necessary to determine whether 3D-printed objects are derivative 
                                                                                                     
(requiring a feature to be able to “stand on its own as work of art traditionally 
conceived, and if the useful article in which it is embodied would be equally 
useful without it”). 
 124. GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 112, § 2.5.3.1. 
 125. Compare id. (arguing that a useful article is conceptually separable if it 
“can stand on its own as a work of art traditionally conceived, and if the useful 
article in which it is embodied would be equally useful without it” (emphasis 
added)), with id. (“[A] useful article is physically separable from the article and 
is thus protectable if it can be physically separated from the article without 
impairing the article’s utility and if, once separated, it can stand alone as a work 
of art traditionally conceived.” (emphasis added)).  
 126. See supra notes 61–73 (explaining the low thresholds for independent 
creation and modicum of creativity for the originality requirement and how a 
work can be fixed in any tangible medium). 
 127. See infra Part VI.A.2 (discussing the copyrightability of CAD files both 
in terms of the originality and fixation requirements and the limitations of the 
idea–expression dichotomy and the useful article doctrine). 
 128. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). 
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works of the CAD files from which they were printed if the CAD 
files themselves are copyrightable. Even if they are not 
copyrightable, CAD files that depict already-existing 
copyrightable objects could be derivative works of the preexisting 
objects. To conduct this analysis, however, one must know what 
constitutes a derivative work and what exactly it means to have 
the exclusive rights to prepare derivative works. 
A. What Works Are “Derivative”? 
Section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 defines a derivative 
work as a “work based upon one or more preexisting works, such 
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”129 A 
derivative work must therefore be (1) a transformation, recasting, 
or adaptation of (2) a preexisting work. 
To qualify as a derivative work, a work must transform, 
adapt, or recast a preexisting work.130 Transformativeness, in the 
context of derivative works, is a change in content, rather than a 
change in the purpose of the work.131 The listed examples of 
derivative works in § 101 of the Copyright Act suggest as much, 
focusing on content-based changes such as “translation,”132 
“motion picture version,”133 and “abridgment,”134 rather than a 
change in purpose, such as parody.135 Examples in case law of 
                                                                                                     
 129. Id. § 101. 
 130. See id. (defining “derivative work” under the Copyright Act). 
 131. See R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work 
Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 494 (2008) (comparing the 
transformativeness requirement for derivative works, which focuses on change 
in content, with the transformativeness requirement for fair use, which focuses 
on the purposes of the copyrighted work and the potentially infringing work). 
 132. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) 
(determining that parody is transformative for purposes of fair use); Reese, 
supra note 131, at 486–94 (determining that a transformation in purpose is 
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transformative content constituting derivative works include the 
transformation of a magazine cover photograph into a computer 
animation136 and user-created video game levels.137 
For a derivative work to be transformative, however, there 
must be a preexisting work off of which it is based.138 The 
preexisting work must be copyrightable itself.139 Although this is 
not mentioned expressly in the Copyright Act, the requirement 
that the preexisting work be copyrightable prevents the 
protection of derivative works from extending to subject matter 
outside the realm of copyright law.140 Furthermore, a new work 
will be “based on”141 a preexisting work, and therefore will be a 
derivative work, only if the two are substantially related so that 
                                                                                                     
necessary for fair use, and that a mere transformation of content is not 
sufficient). For further discussion of the transformativeness requirement of fair 
use, see infra notes 176–82 and accompanying text. 
 136. See Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 
2001) (concluding that the defendant’s computer animation of plaintiff’s 
photograph of a diver violated the plaintiff’s right to prepare derivative works).  
 137. See Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that user-created levels for the Duke Nukem 3D video game were 
effectively sequels, and therefore derivative works). Professor Reese notes that 
Micro Star expressly mentions transformativeness only once, in a footnote, in 
which the court stated that the levels were not transformative. See Reese, supra 
note 131, at 474 (“In reviewing Micro Star’s fair use claim, however, the court 
discussed transformativeness only in a single footnote, in which it concluded, 
with no further analysis, that the additional game levels ‘can hardly be 
described as transformative; anything but.’” (quoting Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 
1113 n.6)). But the court was using “transformative” in the fair use, 
transformative-purpose sense (Micro Star also considers the issue of fair use). 
See id. (“[I]n discussing the transformativeness of Micro Star’s use, it never even 
adverted to the transformation of the underlying work involved in preparing the 
derivatives.”). 
 138. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (providing that a derivative work is “based 
upon one or more preexisting works” (emphasis added)). 
 139. See Ets-Hoken v. Skyy Spirits, 225 F.3d 1068, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“Under the Copyright Act, a work is not a ‘derivative work’ unless it is ‘based 
upon one or more preexisting works’ and, in order to qualify as a ‘preexisting 
work,’ the underlying work must be copyrightable.”). 
 140. See id. at 1079 (“[T]he fact that the term ‘derivative work’ appears only 
in the Copyright Act, and not, for example, in the patent or trademark statutes, 
indicate[s] that for a work to qualify as a derivative work, the work from which 
it derives must itself be within the ambit of copyright.”). 
 141. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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the new work would otherwise be infringing on the copyright of 
the preexisting work.142 
B. Rights Associated with Derivative Works 
Derivative works can qualify for copyright protection in two 
ways. First, a derivative work that otherwise meets the § 102 
copyrightability criteria can qualify for independent copyright 
protection.143 The originality requirement for derivative works is 
the same as that for copyrightability generally.144 Thus, to be 
independently copyrightable as a derivative work, the new work 
must have been created independently and must possess a 
modicum of creativity.145 Second, the possibility of independent 
copyrightability notwithstanding, § 106(2) of the Copyright Act of 
1976 grants authors of copyrighted works “exclusive rights to . . . 
prepare derivative works.”146 In this way, the author of an 
original work has the opportunity to capitalize on her copyright 
for use of the work beyond its immediate scope.147 When someone 
                                                                                                     
 142. 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01 (2012) 
(explaining that a derivative work is “based on” the underlying work “only if 
[the new work] would be considered an infringing work if the material which it 
has derived from a preexisting work had been taken without the consent of a 
copyright proprietor of such preexisting work”). The new work must be 
“substantially similar in both ideas and expression.” Micro Star v. FormGen 
Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998). Idea is embodied in the “objective 
details of the works,” while expression focuses on the “total concept and feel of 
the works.” Id. 
 143. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (“The subject matter of copyright as 
specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works . . . .”); see 
also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 
1992) (implying that derivative works are themselves copyrightable if they meet 
the criteria of 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)). 
 144. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 1266 
n.7 (10th Cir. 2008) (“In . . . examining the elements that are original to the 
author, the originality analysis ought to be the same.”). 
 145. See supra notes 61–67 and accompanying text (identifying independent 
creation and a modicum of creativity as necessary components of originality and 
further explaining each component). 
 146. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012).  
 147. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 573 (6th ed. 2012) 
(explaining how authors such as John Grisham, Michael Crichton, and J.K. 
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without the original author’s permission creates a work that is 
derivative per § 101 of the original author’s copyrighted work, 
that person is liable for infringement of the original author’s 
copyright in the preexisting work.148 While derivative works must 
satisfy the § 102 requirements to achieve independent protection, 
“the Act does not require that the derivative work be protectable 
for its preparation to infringe.”149  
In sum, a derivative work is based on a preexisting work and 
transforms that work’s content.150 The author of preexisting 
copyrighted work is protected from infringing derivative works in 
two ways: he can seek independent protection for his own 
derivative works,151 and the derivative works of others infringe on 
his exclusive right to prepare such works.152 An understanding of 
derivative works and the rights associated with them will be 
especially important in copyright cases involving 3D printing 
because infringement actions are likely to arise in cases of 
transformations of content and shifting media.153 
                                                                                                     
Rowling have earned more money from film adaptations and commercial tie-ins 
based on their books than they have for the books themselves). 
 148. See Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“[The] copyright holder enjoys the exclusive right to prepare derivative works 
based on [Duke Nukem 3D]. . . . [T]he audiovisual displays generated when 
[Duke Nukem 3D] is run in conjunction with the N/I CD MAP files are 
derivative works that infringe this exclusivity.”). 
 149. Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 
30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 231 n.75 (1983) [hereinafter Goldstein, 
Derivative Rights]; accord Lone Ranger Television v. Program Radio Corp., 740 
F.2d 718, 722 (9th Cir. 1984)) (“[I]t makes no difference that the derivation may 
not satisfy certain requirements for statutory copyright registration itself.”). 
 150. See supra notes 130–42 and accompanying text (explaining the 
requirements for derivative works). 
 151. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text (discussing how a 
derivative work can be independently copyrightable). 
 152. See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text (explaining how a work 
can infringe on an author’s right to prepare derivative works). 
 153. See, e.g., Nathan Hurst, HBO Blocks 3-D Printed Game of Thrones 
iPhone Dock, WIRED (Feb. 13, 2013, 1:57 PM), http://www.wired.com/design/ 
2013/02/got-hbo-cease-and-desist/all (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (describing how 
HBO sent a cease and desist letter to an individual who designed a CAD file for 
an iPhone dock resembling the Iron Throne from the Game of Thrones television 
series) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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V. Fair Use 
In cases in which the court will find a work otherwise 
infringing, fair use is the defendant’s primary shield, “the most 
important—and amorphous—limitation on the otherwise 
extraordinarily broad rights granted to copyright owners under 
§ 106 of the Act.”154 Section 107 of the Copyright Act, intending to 
codify common law doctrine,155 specifically provides for the 
defense of fair use.156 Under the statute the court shall consider 
four factors:  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect 
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.157 
Insofar as “these factors are all weighed in the ‘equitable rule of 
reason’ balance,” no one factor should be dispositive.158 An inquiry 
need not end there, however. The factors are not exhaustive; 
rather, courts may take into account other considerations.159 
                                                                                                     
 154. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use 
Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 551 (2008). 
 155. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (“The bill endorses the purpose 
and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition 
to freeze the doctrine in the statute . . . .”). 
 156. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 
106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of 
copyright.”). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 
(1984). 
 159. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Other relevant factors may also be considered, since fair use is 
an ‘equitable rule of reason’ to be applied in light of the overall purposes of the 
Copyright Act.” (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 448, 454)). 
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A. The Purpose and Character of the Use 
Courts have divided the first fair use factor—the purpose and 
the character of the use—into two separate inquiries: whether the 
use is commercial or noncommercial, and whether the use is 
transformative.160 An analysis of the first factor thus requires an 
examination of both subfactors. 
1. Commercial or Noncommercial Use 
The first inquiry concerning the fair use factor of purpose 
and character of the use is whether the use in question is 
commercial or noncommercial. As the Supreme Court noted in 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,161 “every 
commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an 
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the 
owner of the copyright.”162 On the other hand, noncommercial use 
will constitute fair use unless there is “proof either that the 
particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, 
it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted 
                                                                                                     
 160. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(discussing first whether the search engine’s use of thumbnail photos was 
commercial, and then noting that “the second part of the inquiry . . . involves the 
transformative nature of the use”). After Sony, courts tended to consider only 
whether the use was commercial or noncommercial until Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) 
(reestablishing that commercial use alone is not sufficient to find against fair 
use, but that courts must also consider whether the use has a transformative 
purpose). 
 161. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In Sony, the court considered whether the sale of 
Betamax video tape recorders (VTRs) to the public violated any of plaintiff’s 
copyrights. Id. at 420. In examining whether VTR users engaged in 
unauthorized “time-shifting” (recording publicly broadcast programs for later 
viewings) constituted copyright infringement, the Court focused on the fair use 
doctrine. Id. at 447. The Court conducted the four-factor analysis provided in 17 
U.S.C. § 107, focusing on the fact that those who recorded television programs 
did so for private, noncommercial use, and that VTR recordings would likely 
benefit the market for plaintiff’s home videos rather than harm it. Id. at 449–53. 
The Court concluded that use of the Betamax VTRs constituted fair use and 
that “Sony’s sale of [Betamax] equipment to the general public does not 
constitute contributory infringement of respondents’ copyrights.” Id. at 456. 
 162. Id. at 451. 
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work.”163 In Sony, the Court agreed with the district court’s 
findings that owners’ use of Betamax video tape recorders to 
record television programs for personal, non-profit-making 
purposes was noncommercial.164 Since Sony, however, courts and 
scholars have clarified what constitutes noncommercial use165 
and have rejected the notion that commercial use creates a 
presumption against fair use.166 
Although Sony drew the commercial–noncommercial line at 
whether the user sought to make a profit,167 courts have since 
gone further in defining what constitutes a commercial use. In 
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc.,168 the Ninth Circuit stated that 
“[d]irect economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a 
commercial use. Rather, repeated and exploitative copying of 
copyrighted works, even if the copies are not offered for sale, may 
constitute a commercial use.”169 In determining whether peer-to-
peer file sharing constituted fair use, the court found that the use 
was “commercial . . . demonstrated by a showing that repeated 
and exploitative unauthorized copies of copyrighted works were 
made to save the expense of purchasing authorized copies.”170 A 
                                                                                                     
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. at 450 (“If the Betamax were used to make copies for a 
commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. 
The contrary presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District 
Court’s findings plainly establish that time-shifting for private home use must 
be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.”). 
 165. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(positing that “[d]irect economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a 
commercial use”). 
 166. Beebe, supra note 154, at 571–72 (discussing circuit courts’ criticism of 
the so-called “Sony presumption” and how the Supreme Court eventually 
“explicitly demoted the commerciality of the defendant’s use to merely one issue 
among others that a court may consider as part of its analysis of the ‘purpose 
and character’ of the defendant’s use”). 
 167. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 
(1984) (“If the Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-
making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary 
presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District Court’s findings 
plainly establish that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized 
as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.”). 
 168. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 169. Id. at 1015. 
 170. Id. 
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use is commercial, therefore, either if it is for purposes of making 
a profit or if it provides an alternative, free means of obtaining 
copyrighted material. 
But while courts have broadened the definition of a 
commercial use, they have reduced the impact of a finding that 
such use is commercial. Although the Supreme Court determined 
in Sony that a finding of commercial use creates a presumption 
against fair use,171 the Court explicitly rejected the “Sony 
presumption” in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music.172 The Court 
explained that “[t]he language of the statute makes clear that the 
commercial or nonprofit educational purpose of a work is only one 
element of the first factor enquiry into its purpose and 
character.”173 If commerciality of the use were the sole 
determining consideration in the first factor, “the presumption 
would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the 
preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment, 
criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research, since these 
activities ‘are generally conducted for profit in this country.’”174 
Since Campbell, courts have considered commercial use an 
important but not dispositive consideration weighing against fair 
use.175 
2. Transformative Purpose 
Because whether a use was commercial could no longer by 
itself determine the first factor, courts needed to focus on other 
considerations. The Supreme Court provided such a consideration 
                                                                                                     
 171. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450 (establishing the “Sony presumption”). 
 172. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (“In giving 
virtually dispositive weight to the commercial nature of the parody, the Court of 
Appeals erred.”). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 592 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 175. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“A commercial use weighs against a finding of fair use but is not conclusive on 
the issue.”); UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining that the first factor inquiry was not over simply 
because the defendant did not dispute that its purpose was commercial). 
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in Campbell, determining that a “transformative purpose” 
weighed in favor of fair use.176 The Court defined 
transformativeness as “add[ing] something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message.”177 Furthermore, in 
Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, Professor R. 
Anthony Reese differentiates between transformativeness in fair 
use and derivative works analyses.178 Professor Reese explains 
that transformativeness in the latter context requires a 
transformation of content, but for fair use, courts instead “focus 
on whether the purpose of the defendant’s use is 
transformative.”179 For example, while courts have determined 
that parody180 and thumbnail reproductions of copyrighted 
photographs for Internet search engines181 are sufficiently 
transformative purposes, a “space-shift” of digital music file 
storage from CD format to an online MP3 database is not.182  
                                                                                                     
 176. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Although such transformative use is 
not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use . . . the more transformative the 
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, 
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Reese, supra note 131, at 494 (comparing transformativeness in 
terms of the derivative work right with transformativeness in terms of fair use). 
 179. Id. (emphasis added). 
 180. See id. (“Suffice it to say now that parody has an obvious claim to 
transformative value . . . .”). 
 181. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(determining that the defendant search engine’s use of a thumbnail 
reproduction of the plaintiff photographer’s copyrighted work served a 
functional, rather than aesthetic purpose, and therefore was sufficiently 
transformative); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (“Although an image may have been created originally to serve an 
entertainment, aesthetic, or informative function, a search engine transforms 
the image into a pointer directing a user to a source of information.”). 
 182. See UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that “a transformative ‘space shift’ by which 
subscribers can enjoy the sound recordings contained on their CDs without 
lugging around the physical discs themselves” was a simply a transformation to 
another medium, and not a transformative purpose as required under the first 
fair use factor). 
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B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
The second fair use factor per § 107 of the Copyright Act, 
after the purpose and character of the use, is “the nature of the 
copyrighted work.”183 Courts have examined the nature of the 
copyrighted work through two inquiries. First, they have focused 
on whether a work is creative or noncreative, positing that the 
former is “closer to the core of intended copyright protection than 
are mere fact-based works” and thus more likely to be covered by 
fair use.184 Second, “[p]ublished works are more likely [than 
unpublished works] to qualify as fair use because the first 
appearance of the artist’s expression has already occurred.”185 
Courts often do not even mention this factor, and when they do, it 
seldom plays a role in the outcome of the case.186 
C. The Amount of the Portion Used in Relation to the Copyrighted 
Work as a Whole 
Section 107 directs courts to consider as the third fair use 
factor “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”187 The Ninth Circuit 
has explained that “the extent of permissible copying varies with 
the purpose and character of the use.”188 But generally, “the more 
the defendant takes of the plaintiff’s work, the less likely it is 
that the taking will qualify as a fair use.”189 This does not mean, 
however, that copying a work in its entirety will preclude a 
finding of fair use.190 Rather, the question is whether the new 
                                                                                                     
 183. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 184. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 185. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820. 
 186. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 610 (“Despite § 107[] . . . 17.7% of the 306 
opinions failed even to refer to the factor, while an additional 6.5% did so only to 
call it irrelevant. . . . [T]he outcome of factor two typically has no significant 
effect on the overall outcome of the fair use test.”). 
 187. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 188. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 189. Beebe, supra note 154, at 615. 
 190. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 
2007) (“The fact that Google incorporates the entire Perfect 10 image in to the 
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work uses a sufficient amount of the copyrighted work to 
supersede that work.191  
D. The Effect on the Market of the Copyrighted Use 
Finally, for the fourth fair use factor, § 107 directs courts to 
consider “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.”192 The factor applies to “[n]ot only 
the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the 
alleged infringer, but also ‘whether unrestricted and wide-spread 
conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result 
in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market for the 
original.’”193 For example, the Court in Sony decided that the sale 
of Betamax recorders would not negatively affect either television 
revenue through a decline in ratings or the infant home video 
industry.194 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit concluded in Napster 
that peer-to-peer file sharing sites harm the music industry both 
by reducing CD sales and by preventing record companies from 
entering the digital download market.195 Furthermore, Justice 
O’Connor noted that this factor is “undoubtedly the single most 
                                                                                                     
search engine results does not diminish the transformative nature of Google’s 
use.”). 
 191. See id. at 1165–66 (determining that Google’s use did not supersede 
Perfect 10’s copyrighted photographs because there was no evidence that users 
were downloading the thumbnail images on Google instead of paying for access 
to the copyrighted images). 
 192. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 193. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 586–87 (1994) (quoting 3 
M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][4] (1993)). 
 194. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
452–53 (1984) (rejecting the argument “that live television or movie audiences 
will decrease as more people watch Betamax tapes as an alternative”). 
 195. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“Napster harms the market in ‘at least’ two ways: it reduces audio CD sales 
among college students and it ‘raises barriers to plaintiffs’ entry into the market 
for digital downloading of music.’” (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2000))). 
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important element of fair use.”196 Some scholars, however, have 
questioned whether this is really the case.197 
E. Other Considerations 
Although § 107 provides only four factors, courts have 
interpreted the statute as permitting other considerations.198 The 
legislative history of the Copyright Act supports this 
interpretation, explaining that “since the doctrine is an equitable 
rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible.”199 
Furthermore, “there [was] no disposition to freeze the doctrine in 
the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological 
change.”200 In considering unenumerated factors, courts have 
focused on the extent to which the use in question benefits the 
public.201 Although the courts have considered the public benefit 
of a use while analyzing other § 107 factors,202 the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
 196. Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).  
 197. See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 154, at 617 (arguing that the fourth factor is 
the “most important” only because it “essentially constitutes a metafactor under 
which courts integrate their analyses of the other three factors and, in doing so, 
arrive at the outcome not simply of the fourth factor, but of the overall test”). 
This explains why a court’s determination of the fourth factor almost always 
coincides with its conclusion of whether the fair use defense applied. See id. 
(“[O]f the 141 opinions that found that factor four disfavored fair use, 140 found 
no fair use.”). For more on Beebe’s criticisms of current fair use doctrine, see 
infra notes 451–65 and accompanying text. 
 198. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Other relevant factors may also be considered, since fair use is 
an ‘equitable rule of reason’ to be applied in light of the overall purposes of the 
Copyright Act.” (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 448, 454 (1984))). 
 199. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 
(1975) (“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return to an 
‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate 
artistic creativity for the public good.”). 
 202. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1166 (9th Cir. 
2007) (integrating the public benefit inquiry into the court’s first factor analysis 
by examining “the significantly transformative nature of Google’s search engine, 
particularly in light of its public benefit”); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling 
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[Analysis of the fourth fair 
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has also considered public benefit as an independent factor in the 
balancing test.203  
Under the current doctrine, therefore, a fair use inquiry 
consists of the four statutory factors,204 and if the court elects to 
consider them, other extrinsic factors.205 The issue of whether 
courts can effectively apply the current doctrine to 3D printing 
cases will ultimately hinge on the extent to which courts can—
and should—consider factors besides those mentioned explicitly 
in the statute.206 
VI. Analysis of the Legal Issues Pertaining to 3D Printing 
Among the copyright issues pertaining to 3D printing are the 
following: whether CAD files are copyrightable; whether CAD 
files and 3D-printed objects are derivative works protected by 
copyrights on already-existing works; and whether courts can 
adequately apply the fair use defense as currently constructed to 
cases in which defendants have 3D printed or created CAD files 
of copyrighted works.207 It is necessary to examine these issues in 
                                                                                                     
use factor] requires a balancing of ‘the benefit the public will derive if the use is 
permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner will receive if the use is 
denied.’” (quoting MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981))). 
 203. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 
(1984) (“The District Court’s conclusions are buttressed by the fact that to the 
extent time-shifting expands public access to freely broadcast television 
programs, it yields societal benefits.”).  
 204. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (providing the four factors 
from § 107).  
 205. See supra notes 198–203 and accompanying text (explaining the 
justification for courts’ consideration of other factors, including the public 
benefit of the use). 
 206. See infra Part VI.C.2–3 (criticizing the current doctrine and advocating 
for the application in the context of 3D printing of Professor Edward Lee’s 
technological fair use, which considers the public benefit of the technology and 
the potential harm to the market of that technology if the court finds no fair 
use). 
 207. See supra Part I (setting out the issues of this Note). Another copyright 
issue that will likely arise in the context of 3D printing is whether websites such 
as Thingiverse will be secondarily liable for a third party’s infringement. See 
Rideout, supra note 53, at 170–73 (discussing whether Thingiverse would fall 
under one of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s safe harbor provisions). 
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this order. Whether CAD files are copyrightable will determine 
how they fit into the derivative works inquiry,208 and to assess 
whether the fair use doctrine applies in a particular case, one 
must know whether works are protected in the first place.209 
A. Copyrightability of CAD Files 
Copyrightability issues in the context of 3D printing center 
on the copyrightability of CAD files. 3D-printed objects fall 
clearly within the category of “pictorial, graphical, and sculptural 
works” protected by copyright,210 and courts will likely be able to 
discern the copyrightability of such objects within the current 
jurisprudence.211 CAD files, on the other hand, do not fit neatly 
into one of the categories explicitly listed in the Copyright Act. A 
CAD file is a computer file used to send a design to a 3D 
printer,212 but it is also the 3D-printable design itself.213 To 
concentrate only on the copyrightability of the design is to ignore 
the copyrightability of the computer code, and vice versa. 
                                                                                                     
 208. See supra notes 138–39, 141–49, and accompanying text (discussing 
how a work must be based on a preexisting copyrighted work to be protected as 
a derivative work, and whether a derivative work must independently meet the 
copyrightability requirements to be protected). 
 209. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (providing the four factors for fair use, all of 
which refer to the “copyrighted work”); see also, e.g., Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 
154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding first that the defendant’s 
compilation of user-created video game levels infringed on the plaintiff’s right to 
create derivative works, and then considering whether the defendant’s 
compilation was a fair use). 
 210. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (listing as copyrightable works “(1) literary 
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic 
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic 
works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works”). 
 211. See Weinberg, What’s the Deal?, supra note 25, at 8–13 (concentrating 
on the useful article doctrine and separability as exemplified in cases such as 
Brandir and Barnhart to determine whether 3D-printed objects would be 
copyrightable). For discussion on whether 3D-printed objects are independently 
copyrightable derivative works, see infra Part VI.B.2. 
 212. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (discussing how a CAD 
file sends code to a 3D printer to produce the 3D-printed object). 
 213. See The Wired 3D Print-Off, supra note 26 (including the two-
dimensional computer renderings of the CAD drawing contest entries). 
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Furthermore, because the § 102(a) criteria of originality and 
fixation in a tangible medium are relatively lenient,214 the 
question of copyrightability will depend on limitations such as the 
useful article doctrine215 and the idea–expression dichotomy.216 To 
evaluate how these limitations apply to CAD files, it will be 
helpful first to search for an analog among other types of works 
that the courts have had the opportunity to examine.217 Through 
a survey of the copyrightability of works potentially analogous to 
CAD files—architectural plans and other technical drawings, 
recipes, computer software, and computer program outputs—and 
comparing these works to CAD files, this subpart formulates a 
test for copyrightability of CAD files. 
1. Searching for a Work Analogous to CAD Files 
When Congress and the courts have confronted copyright 
issues surrounding new technologies, they have often resorted to 
analogy. In its final report to Congress, the National Commission 
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) 
concluded that “the computer affects the copyright status of a 
resultant work no more than the employment of a still or motion-
picture camera, a tape recorder, or a typewriter.”218 Similarly, 
courts have compared circuit boards that speed up the rate of 
play in video games to playing phonograph records at faster-than-
recorded speeds,219 and they have equated a detailed description 
                                                                                                     
 214. See supra notes 61–74 and accompanying text (discussing how the 
Copyright Act sets a relatively low threshold with the originality and fixation 
requirements but that other statutory limits exist). 
 215. See supra Part III.B.2 (defining and discussing the useful article 
doctrine). 
 216. See supra Part III.B.1 (defining and discussing the idea–expression 
dichotomy). 
 217. See Weinberg, What’s the Deal?, supra note 25, at 22 (“[I]t is possible to 
draw guidance and principles by analogy from cases not involving 3D 
printing . . . .”). 
 218. NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF 
COPYRIGHTED WORKS 45 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT]. 
 219. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir. 
1983) (“There is this critical difference between playing records at a faster than 
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of an audiovisual display to sheet music.220 Searching for proper 
analogies to CAD files, therefore, seems an appropriate place to 
begin a copyrightability inquiry. 
a. Architectural Plans 
Given that CAD files are often described as blueprints,221 it 
makes sense to begin by examining whether this is an 
appropriate comparison. The Architectural Works Copyright 
Protection Act of 1990 (AWCPA)222 amended § 102 of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 to include architectural works among the 
list of explicitly copyright-eligible works of authorship.223 The 
amendment also included in its definition of architectural work 
“the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of 
expression, including a building, architectural plans, or 
drawings.”224 Because the architectural work itself is embodied in 
the plans, a copyright in the blueprint extends protection not just 
to the plans but also to the physical structure itself, even if it has 
not yet been constructed.225 
                                                                                                     
recorded speed and playing video games at a faster than manufactured rate: 
there is an enormous demand for speeded-up video games but there is little if 
any demand for speeded-up records.”). 
 220. See Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“This raises the interesting question whether an exact, down to the last detail, 
description of an audiovisual display counts as a permanent or concrete form for 
purposes of Galoob. . . . What, after all, does sheet music do but describe in 
precise detail the way a copyrighted melody sounds?”). 
 221. See Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome, supra note 24 (“3D printing starts 
with a blueprint, usually one created with a computer aided design (CAD) 
program running on a desktop computer.”); Hanna, supra note 12 
(“Downloading or sharing [CAD] files could constitute copyright infringement, 
although the strength of the protection for such files will turn on whether courts 
treat them more like blueprints than art.”); Greenberg, supra note 16 
(discussing the number of “blueprints” uploaded onto Thingiverse in the past 
year). 
 222. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 
102(a)(8), 120 (2012). 
 223. See id. § 102(a) (“Works of authorship include . . . architectural 
works.”). 
 224. Id. § 101. 
 225. See Hunt v. Pasternack, 192 F.3d 877, 878–79 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Because 
the statute provides that the copyright is in the design as embodied not only in a 
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Although architectural plans seem like a logical analog to 
CAD files, important differences make the comparison 
inappropriate. CAD files and blueprints are both pictorial 
depictions of 3D structures that may eventually be built—hence 
the comparisons between the two in news articles explaining how 
3D printing works.226 If CAD files were afforded the same 
protection as architectural blueprints, then the CAD designer 
would receive copyright protection not only for the CAD file itself 
but for any 3D-printed versions that might eventually exist. Such 
protection would be appealing for designers, given the volume of 
CAD downloads on sites such as Thingiverse.227 Congress, 
however, granted broad protection specifically to architectural 
works, as embodied in plans.228 Moreover, Congress granted this 
extra protection to architectural works through plans to address 
a particular problem: “a potential gap in protection may exist 
where an architectural work has been depicted in plans or 
drawings, but has not yet been constructed.”229 Congress was 
concerned that in the months or years between the completion of 
architectural plans and the end of construction on the 
architectural work itself, someone “could construct an identical 
building but escape liability so long as the plans or drawings were 
not copyrighted.”230 The same problem, however, does not exist 
with 3D printing. If a CAD designer desires a copyright in the 
3D-printed object itself, he need only wait a few hours at most for 
                                                                                                     
building, but alternatively in the architectural plans, we hold that construction 
of the actual building was not required.”); Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland 
Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (“Now the 
holder of a copyright in architectural plans is entitled to two forms of protection 
under the Act[:] . . . one in the architectural work (§ 102(a)(8)), the other in the 
plans or drawings (§ 102(a)(5)).” (citing T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. Timber Works, Inc., 
459 F.3d 97, 109 (1st Cir. 2006))). 
 226. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (providing such 
comparisons). 
 227. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (explaining how Thingiverse’s downloads 
doubled in 2012 to 8.5 million with half a million between August and 
November). 
 228. See supra notes 222–24 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
AWCPA added protection for architectural works). 
 229. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19 (1990). 
 230. Id. 
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a 3D printer to complete the finished product.231 CAD files are not 
explicitly mentioned in the Copyright Act, and they do not 
present the same problems as architectural plans. Therefore, 
basing a determination of the copyrightability of CAD files on the 
copyrightability of architectural plans would be inappropriate. 
b. Other Technical Drawings and Pre-1990 Architectural Plans 
Perhaps a more accurate comparison to CAD files would be 
technical drawings in general. Whereas Congress has provided 
for the protection of architectural works as a special category, it 
included technical drawings in its definition of pictorial, 
graphical, and sculptural works.232 Copyright protection for 
technical drawings, however, extends only to the drawings 
themselves, rather than also extending to finished products such 
as recreational vehicles233 or medicine cabinets.234 Similarly, 
before Congress passed the AWCPA in 1990, architectural plans 
were limited to protection as pictorial or graphical works.235 
                                                                                                     
 231. See Olson, supra note 45 (“With 3-D printing, it takes just hours [to 
create a prototype].”). 
 232. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“‘Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ 
include . . . technical drawings . . . .”). Courts have recognized on numerous 
occasions that technical drawings fall within the category of pictorial or 
graphical works included in § 102(a). See, e.g., Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland 
Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (“Graphic 
works, including technical drawings, are among the works that are eligible for 
copyright protection.” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2012))); Niemi v. Am. Axle 
Mfg. & Holding, Inc., No. 05-74210, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50153, at *7 (E.D. 
Mich. July 24, 2006) (“Plaintiffs’ technical drawings are original pictorial or 
graphic works protected by 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).”). 
 233. See Forest River, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 760 (“However, because the 
Plaintiff’s copyright protects the design drawing from being copied, and the 
Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendant created derivative Floor Plan 
drawings, it states a claim for copyright infringement as to the copies (as 
distinct from the actual trailer).”). 
 234. See Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 435–36 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2003) (determining that copyrights in technical drawings of medicine 
cabinets did not extend to the cabinets themselves). 
 235. See Eales v. Envtl. Lifestyles, Inc., 958 F.2d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It 
is settled law that architectural drawings and plans are thus eligible for 
protection under the copyright code as ‘pictorial, graphic, [or] sculptural 
works.’”). In Eales, the court concluded that the AWCPA would not have applied 
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Courts limit the copyrights to the drawings themselves because of 
the useful article doctrine.236 While the “AWCPA now extends 
copyright protection to as-built architectural works, [it] does not 
extend that protection to other useful articles.”237 Except in the 
case of architectural works, for which Congress made a specific 
exception, the Copyright Act “does not afford, to the owner of 
copyright in a work that portrays a useful article as such, any 
greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, 
or display of the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to 
such works under the law.”238 In other words, while the drawing 
of an object may be copyrighted, the object portrayed in the 
drawing must overcome the useful article doctrine to receive 
protection. 
More importantly, however, the useful article doctrine does 
not bar the copyrightability of technical drawings themselves.239 
One could argue that by serving as a blueprint for the 
construction of an object, a technical drawing is not copyrightable 
because it has a utilitarian function.240 Section 107 of the 
Copyright Act, however, defines a useful article as one that has 
“an intrinsic utilitarian function that [does] not merely . . . 
portray the appearance of the article or . . . convey 
information.”241 The Ninth Circuit noted in Eales v. 
                                                                                                     
to the plaintiff’s architectural plans even if the copyright had not arose before 
the AWCPA was passed because “this case involves a claim of infringement of 
copyrighted plans, not a structure.” Id. at 880 n.2. The Ninth Circuit later 
acknowledged that this conclusion was incorrect and that the AWCPA should 
apply in cases in which the building has not yet been constructed. See Hunt v. 
Pasternack, 192 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999) (“It is now clear that this dicta in 
Eales is inaccurate.”). 
 236. See supra Part III.B.2 for an explanation of the useful article doctrine. 
 237. Forest River, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 760; see also Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 
at 434–36 (refusing to extend protection in a technical drawing of a medicine 
cabinet to the physical cabinets because of the useful article doctrine, despite 
the AWCPA’s extension of similar protection to architectural works). 
 238. 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2012). 
 239. See infra notes 241–45 and accompanying text (explaining why 
technical drawings themselves do not fail a useful article inquiry). 
 240. See Eales, 958 F.2d at 879 (outlining the defendants’ argument that the 
plaintiff’s plans were not copyrightable because they did not survive the useful 
article exception to copyrightability). 
 241. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
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Environmental Lifestyles, Inc.242 that, unlike with 
noncopyrightable useful articles, “the intrinsic function of an 
architectural plan is to convey the information necessary to 
enable the reader to construct a building.”243 Because the court 
decided Eales by treating the architectural plans at issue as 
pictorial or graphical works instead of applying the AWCPA,244 it 
is logical to conclude that the intrinsic function of any technical 
drawing is to convey information necessary to enable the reader 
to build the depicted object.245 Finally, technical drawings survive 
the idea–expression dichotomy because the act of composing the 
drawing serves as expression of the design itself.246 
At first glance, technical drawings seem to be the perfect 
analog for CAD files. Like technical drawings, CAD files are 
designs that convey to the builder necessary information to 
construct a 3D object. But while architectural plans and other 
technical drawings convey information to human beings, who 
then build the object themselves or with the help of machines, 
CAD files send coded information directly to a 3D printer, which 
then constructs the 3D object without human intervention.247 It is 
unclear whether the statutory exception to useful articles, 
permitting copyrightability of those works whose “intrinsic 
utilitarian function . . . convey[s] information,”248 applies only to 
                                                                                                     
 242. 958 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 243. Id. at 879–80. 
 244. See supra note 235 (explaining how architectural plans were 
protectable only as pictorial or graphical works until Congress passed the 
AWCPA). 
 245. See Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F. 
Supp. 2d 753, 760 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (applying the doctrine from NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT that “a copyright for a work of utility protects only against copying of 
such works for purposes of explanation” to a nonarchitectural technical drawing 
(quoting 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[D][2] (1990))). 
 246. See Eales, 958 F.2d at 880 (“Eales’ plans laid out the location and sizes 
of numerous features of model home #3, and thus her ideas were ‘fixed’ in 
tangible form. That is all the copyright code requires. Eales won damages 
because defendants copied the plans she drew, not the idea she created.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 247. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text (explaining the process 
through which a CAD file goes from a drawing on a screen to a 3D-printed 
object). 
 248. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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information conveyed to a human being, or whether digitally 
conveyed computer code would be covered.249 If the function of 
sending code to a 3D printer did fall under the statutory 
definition of useful article, then one would have to determine if 
the design were conceptually or physically separable from the 
functional code.250 Furthermore, while one who reads a blueprint 
must interpret the design and included dimensions to determine 
the process by which the object should be constructed, “CAD 
files . . . carry directions for manufacturing objects.”251 Although 
the design-drawing element of a CAD file would on its own 
survive the idea–expression dichotomy,252 nothing in the case law 
concerning technical drawings addresses whether the code 
component of a CAD file constitutes copyrightable expression.253 
Therefore, one must look elsewhere to determine the 
copyrightability of CAD files given their inclusion of coded 
instructions. 
c. Recipes 
Recipes are one type of work consisting of a set of 
instructions for which courts have examined the question of 
copyrightability. In Publications International, Ltd. v. Meredith 
                                                                                                     
 249. See infra Part VI.B.3 (analyzing how both the useful article doctrine 
and the idea–expression dichotomy apply to CAD files in the merger inquiry of 
this Note’s proposed test). 
 250. See supra notes 106–25 and accompanying text (outlining the various 
tests for physical and conceptual separability); infra notes 351–56 and 
accompanying text (applying those tests to CAD files). 
 251. Regalado, supra note 20. 
 252. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (explaining why the 
blueprints in Eales survived the idea–expression dichotomy). 
 253. See e.g., Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 
F. Supp. 2d 753, 758 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (concerning hand-drawn technical 
drawings and therefore not addressing issues of whether a code component of a 
drawing is copyrightable). Even in cases concerning non-CAD virtual models, 
courts have not considered whether the computer code corresponding to the 
model is copyrightable. See, e.g., Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 
528 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 2008) (determining that Meshwerks’s derivative 
virtual models of Toyota’s cars were not sufficiently original because they did 
not depict any expressive elements that were not Toyota’s). 
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Corp.,254 the Seventh Circuit concluded that the “functional 
listing of ingredients” in a Dannon Yogurt cookbook did not 
constitute copyrightable subject matter.255 The court noted that 
the plaintiff “was not giving literary expression to his individual 
creative labors. Instead he was writing down an idea, namely the 
ingredients necessary to the preparation of a particular dish.”256 
Furthermore, a recipe that includes preparation instructions does 
not survive the idea–expression dichotomy.257 In certain cases, 
however, recipes can be “sufficiently expressive to exceed the 
boundaries of mere fact.”258 When a recipe includes “‘suggestions 
for presentation, advice on wines to go with the meal, or hints on 
place settings with appropriate music,’ . . . ‘tales of their 
historical or ethnic origin[,’ or] light-hearted or helpful 
commentary,” those aspects of the recipe may be copyrightable.259 
To fall on the expression side of the idea–expression dichotomy, a 
recipe must contain “literary expression.”260  
Like recipes, then, CAD files’ computer codes might be 
copyrightable if they contain some form of literary expression. 
The obvious problem with recipes as an analog to CAD files, 
however, is that while recipes’ instructions are written for human 
interpretation, CAD files’ instructions are written in computer 
code for a 3D printer to read. Thus, it is impossible to measure 
what constitutes literary expression in computer code by 
analyzing literary expression in a cookbook.261 To answer 
questions about the idea–expression dichotomy in terms of CAD 
                                                                                                     
 254. 88 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 255. Id. at 480. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See Harrell v. St. John, 792 F. Supp. 2d 933, 943 (S.D. Miss. 2011) 
(“The recipes are nothing more than a list of ingredients with very basic 
assembly or preparation instructions.”). 
 258. Barbour v. Head, 178 F. Supp. 2d 758, 764 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
 259. Id. (quoting Publ’ns Int’l, 88 F.3d at 481). 
 260. Harrell, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 943. 
 261. Compare Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–
10 (2d Cir. 1992) (considering whether code contains nonessential elements or 
elements dictated by external factors such as mechanical specifications of 
computers on which a program will run), with Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121–23 (2d Cir. 1930) (examining whether characters and 
plot in a play are copyrightable despite the idea–expression dichotomy). 
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files, it will be necessary to examine the copyrightability of 
computer code. 
d. Computer Software 
Courts have addressed the copyrightability of computer code 
primarily in the context of software.262 Computer programs are 
copyrightable in two respects: their codes are protected as 
“literary works,” and their outputs—what appears on the 
screen—are protected as “audiovisual works.”263 Courts have 
struggled with the idea–expression dichotomy in computer 
software cases because “computer programs are written for a 
utilitarian purpose. Expression in the code or structure and 
organization of a program is normally only incidental to that 
purpose. Courts must therefore identify and protect that 
incidental material, while leaving the functional aspects of the 
program free for all to duplicate.”264 Because a computer program 
can be broken down into a number of different levels of code—
individual mathematical instructions, subroutines, routines, 
software modules, higher-level modules, and overall function—
the Second Circuit developed the abstraction–filtration–
comparison test to discern copyrightability at each level of the 
software.265 The abstraction–filtration–comparison test is a sort 
of “all-in-one” test that determines both copyrightability and 
infringement. First the court “dissects” the program into its 
constituent parts, concentrating on the part of the program upon 
                                                                                                     
 262. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 814 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (concerning the copyrightability of a spreadsheet program); Altai, 982 
F.2d at 698 (concerning the copyrightability of a job-scheduling program for IBM 
mainframe computers); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 
F.2d 1222, 1224 (3d Cir. 1986) (concerning the copyrightability of a computer 
program for dental laboratory record keeping). 
 263. See Lemley, supra note 85, at 6 n.25 (noting that the 1980 amendments 
to the Copyright Act added a definition of “computer program” to § 101, but did 
not include them in the list of protectable works because CONTU considered 
them to be both literary and audiovisual works). 
 264. Id. at 7. 
 265. See id. at 13 (explaining why the Second Circuit developed the 
abstraction–filtration–comparison test in Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, 
Inc.). 
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which the defendant is allegedly infringing.266 Second, the court 
“‘filter[s]’ the unprotectable elements out of the program 
structure at every level of abstraction.”267 Finally, the court 
compares the remaining copyrightable elements of the plaintiff’s 
program to those of the allegedly infringing program.268 Given 
that the inquiry at hand concerns copyrightability and not 
whether a specific work is infringing, one should focus on the 
abstraction and filtration portions of the test. 
While the concept of abstraction is fairly straightforward—
break the program into its constituent parts269—the Second 
Circuit elaborated on the filtration portion in Computer 
Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.270 The filtration 
process weeds out structural components of a program that 
constitute any of the following: “elements dictated by efficiency,” 
“elements dictated by external factors,” and “elements taken from 
the public domain.”271 “Elements dictated by efficiency” refer to 
those portions of code that a programmer can express in only so 
many ways to avoid superfluity.272 Such code is not copyrightable 
because the expression of the code has merged with the idea—the 
task that it performs.273 Those elements of the program that are 
not necessarily incidental to the idea pass this first level of 
filtration.274 An element of a program is “dictated by external 
factors” if  
the programmer’s freedom of design choice is . . . 
circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as (1) the 
                                                                                                     
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 13–14. 
 269. See id at 13. (“The first step in this process is to break the ‘structure’ of 
a computer program into different levels of abstraction . . . .”). 
 270. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 271. Id. at 707–10. 
 272. See id. at 708 (“In the context of computer program design, the concept 
of efficiency is akin to deriving the most concise logical proof or formulating the 
most succinct mathematical computation.”). 
 273. See id. at 709 (concluding “that application of the merger doctrine in 
this setting is an effective way to eliminate non-protectable expression 
contained in computer programs”). 
 274. See id. at 708 (determining that those components that are “necessarily 
incidental” to the idea are not protectable). 
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mechanical specifications of the computer on which a 
particular program is intended to run; (2) compatibility 
requirements of other programs with which a program is 
designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer 
manufacturers’ design standards; (4) demands of the industry 
being serviced; and (5) widely accepted programming practices 
within the computer industry.275 
Finally, an element of a program that has “entered the public 
domain by virtue of freely accessible program exchanges and the 
like” is not protected.276 Although the abstraction–filtration–
comparison test is now widely accepted by the courts (albeit 
generating inconsistent results),277 the First Circuit added in 
Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.278 that 
courts could circumvent the abstraction–filtration–comparison 
test if the program element in question was itself a 
noncopyrightable “idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery”279 under § 102(b) of the 
Copyright Act.280  
While the abstraction–filtration–comparison test appears 
capable of answering the question of whether the code in a CAD 
file is copyrightable expression, this potential analog also 
presents problems. On the one hand, it would be easy enough to 
“filter” the code of a CAD file through the three steps of the Altai 
test’s filtration portion. The test would work perfectly if the issue 
were the copyrightability of the CAD program in which one 
designed a CAD file. The problem is that the designer of a CAD 
file does not write the file’s code—at least, not in the sense that 
the programmer of the CAD software does.281 For example, in 
                                                                                                     
 275. Id. at 709–10. 
 276. Id. at 710. 
 277. See Lemley, supra note 85, at 17–19 (discussing the various 
inconsistent results among the circuit courts in applying the test from Altai). 
 278. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 279. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
 280. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815 (holding “that the Lotus menu command 
hierarchy is an uncopyrightable ‘method of operation’” without applying the 
Altai test). 
 281. See The STL Format: Standard Data Format for Fabbers, supra note 45 
(“Most fabber users do not need to be concerned with [the details of StL code]. It 
is provided here for those who are interested in developing hardware or software 
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Tinkercad, a web-based solid modeling CAD program,282 the 
designer creates a CAD file by applying pre-rendered shapes onto 
a virtual “workplane” and altering their dimensions to create a 
3D model.283 The specific design that the user creates will 
determine the exact code that is sent to the 3D printer, but the 
programmer of the software itself must predetermine the 
individual pieces of the code with which the user composes the 
CAD file.284 By comparison, the author of a Microsoft Word 
document is not the author of the code that her computer sends to 
a traditional 2D printer when she wishes to obtain a hard copy. 
Thus, while using computer software as an analog to 3D printing 
presents a useful test for the copyrightability of the code itself, it 
is limited to cases in which the work in question is the software 
itself, rather than a work produced using that software. 
e. Computer-Generated Works and Program Outputs 
The final potential analogs to CAD files are computer-
generated works and program outputs. The author of a computer-
generated work is the person who created the work itself, rather 
than the person who created the underlying program.285 That 
said, “[t]he ultimate use of a program or data base might limit or 
negate the author’s claim of copyright in the ultimate work.”286 
On the one hand, the author of a literary work created on 
Microsoft Word would clearly hold the copyright on that work 
                                                                                                     
that will read or write StL files.”). 
 282. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing solid modeling 
software—as opposed to surface modeling software—as providing users with 
pre-rendered shapes that the CAD designer can then manipulate). 
 283. Tinkercad, TINKERCAD, https://tinkercad.com/ (last visited Jan. 31, 
2014) (providing a free tutorial on how to use Tinkercad and presenting the 
option to download the software for free) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 284. See The STL Format: Standard Data Format for Fabbers, supra note 45 
(providing templates for the code syntax in .stl files). 
 285. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 218, at 45 (“It appears to the 
Commission that authorship of the program or of the input data is entirely 
separate from authorship of the final work . . . .”). 
 286. Id. at 45–46. 
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over Bill Gates.287 But on the other hand, courts have granted 
video game creators copyrights in program outputs (the images 
displayed on the screen) despite the fact that players ultimately 
control what image appears onscreen at a given time.288 In Stern 
Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman,289 the Second Circuit determined 
that although “the entire sequence of all the sights and sounds of 
the game are different each time the game is played, depending 
upon the route and speed the player selects for his spaceship and 
the timing and accuracy of his release of his craft’s bombs and 
lasers,” the creator of the game could hold a valid copyright 
because “many aspects of the sights and the sequence of their 
appearance remain constant during each play of the game. . . . 
The repetitive sequence of a substantial portion of the sights and 
sounds of the game qualifies for copyright protection as an 
audiovisual work.”290 
When a designer uses a CAD program, there are arguably 
two different outputs: the design drawing and the code. The 
former is clearly a computer-generated work, and the author 
holds the copyright. As with the author of a Word document, a 
CAD file designer is responsible for the entire creative content of 
the design. Although programs with premade shape libraries 
might place some limits on the design, the designer’s ability to 
resize and position these shapes ultimately distinguishes such 
CAD software from video game outputs, in which the player has 
comparatively little impact on the program output.291  
                                                                                                     
 287. See MARK A. LEMLEY, PETER S. MENELL, ROBERT P. MERGES, PAMELA 
SAMUELSON & BRIAN W. CARVER, SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 73 (4th ed. 2011) 
(“It would be unreasonable to suggest, for example, that the creator of a word-
processing program owned the documents written using that program.”). 
 288. See Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856–57 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(“We agree with the District Court that the player’s participation does not 
withdraw the audiovisual work from copyright eligibility. . . . Assessing the 
entire effect of the game as it appears and sounds, we conclude that its 
repetitive sequence of images is copyrightable as an audiovisual display.”). 
 289. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 290. Id. at 856. 
 291. Compare id. (explaining that the “appearance . . . of the player’s 
spaceship, the enemy craft, the ground missile bases and fuel depots, and the 
terrain over which . . . the player’s ship fl[ew], as well as the sequence in which 
the missile bases, fuel depots, and terrain appear[ed]” remained constant 
regardless of the player’s manipulations), with Tinkercad, supra note 283 
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The real question is whether the code portion of the CAD file 
is more like a computer-generated work or a program output. 
Although program outputs differ from code insofar as they are 
audiovisual and literary works, respectively,292 they are similar in 
the context of a CAD file because the CAD designer can claim as 
little responsibility, if not less, for the content of the code as a 
video game player can claim for the output on the screen. But 
because a program output is an audiovisual work, a video game 
player can at least directly control what her character does 
onscreen.293 A CAD designer, however, “creates” the code 
necessary to print a 3D object only by creating the design. In 
some programs, at least, he cannot even see the code that 
corresponds to his design much less write the literary work.294 On 
the other hand, the video game player has complete control over a 
relatively small portion of the game, whereas the CAD designer 
ultimately determines the final compilation of code sent to a 3D 
printer (even if the CAD software programmer chooses the syntax 
of the code295 and is responsible for determining what code 
represents a premade shape or a freehand-drawn line of a certain 
length and angle). If the building blocks of code in a CAD file are 
basic enough, the CAD designer, as opposed to the CAD software 
programmer, might be able to claim authorship over the code 
portion of the CAD file. Thus, using computer-generated works 
and program outputs as an analog can shape the analysis of 
whether the CAD designer or the software programmer is the 
author of the code (and therefore whether the abstraction–
                                                                                                     
(allowing the designer to manipulate the dimensions of premade shapes and to 
place them as he chooses in the virtual “workplane”). 
 292. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (explaining how CONTU 
recognized the output of a computer program to be a copyrightable audiovisual 
work and the code to be a copyrightable literary work). 
 293. See Stern Elecs., 669 F.2d at 853 (“The player controls the altitude and 
speed of the spaceship, decides when to release the ship’s supply of bombs, and 
fires lasers that can destroy attacking missiles and aircraft.”). 
 294. See Tinkercad, supra note 283 (providing no opportunity to view the 
code used to create the 3D-printed object). 
 295. See Lemley, supra note 85, at 5 (explaining that code can infringe on a 
copyright not only through the “words” that the programmer chooses to use “but 
also [through] what is called ‘non-literal infringement’—the taking of the 
essence of the author’s expression without using the author’s actual words”). 
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filtration–comparison test applies to CAD file code),296 but it 
cannot provide a bright-line rule. The code portion of a CAD file 
differentiates it from other computer-generated works, and the 
fact that the code is a literary work, along with the amount of the 
code affected by the design, distinguishes it from audiovisual 
program outputs. 
f. CAD Files Lack a Comprehensive Analog 
Although each of the potential analogs noted above touch on 
one aspect of CAD files, none provides a completely translatable 
test for copyrightability. CAD files are different because they 
combine (1) a technical drawing297 with (2) computer code,298 and 
(3) they serve a distinct purpose: they send information to a 3D 
printer to create a 3D object.299 Therefore, any test for the 
copyrightability of CAD files will have to draw on aspects from 
many of the potential analogs to address these three components. 
2. A Composite Test for Copyrightability of CAD Files 
When courts have not been able to find perfect analogs in 
particularly complex cases, they have developed composite tests 
to determine copyrightability. In 1930, Judge Hand examined the 
copyrightability of both the plot and characters of the plaintiff’s 
play to determine whether the defendant’s film infringed in 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.300 More recently, courts have 
                                                                                                     
 296. See supra Part VI.A.1.d (raising the question of whether software 
presents an appropriate analog given the possibility that one must attribute the 
code to the software programmer and not the CAD designer). 
 297. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (describing CAD files as 
blueprints). 
 298. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (explaining how CAD 
files contain a computer code component). 
 299. See supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text (describing how CAD 
files turn a virtual design into a 3D-printed object). 
 300. 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“But we do not doubt that two plays 
may correspond in plot closely enough for infringement. . . . Nor need we hold 
that the same may not be true as to the characters, quite independently of the 
‘plot’ proper . . . .”). 
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resorted to composite tests when the work in question does not 
fall within a category explicitly mentioned in the Copyright Act. 
For example, the Second Circuit addressed other circuits’ 
struggles to formulate a test for the copyrightability of computer 
software301 by developing the abstraction–filtration–comparison 
test, which directs courts to ascertain the copyrightability of each 
relevant portion of the work.302 In a similar manner, the Ninth 
Circuit examined each of the different components of the Duke 
Nukem 3D video game in Micro Star to determine which 
components contained copyrighted artwork.303 It is appropriate, 
then, to formulate a test to determine the copyrightability of CAD 
files that examines independently their different components. 
First, this test will ascertain the copyrightability of the design 
drawing component under the same rules as a technical drawing. 
Second, the test will determine whether the computer code 
component is copyrightable by inquiring into the authorship of 
the code and by applying the abstraction–filtration–comparison 
test. Finally, in cases in which the design drawing is 
copyrightable but the code is not, the test will inquire whether 
the expression of the former has merged with the idea embodied 
in the latter. 
a. Determine the Copyrightability of the Design Drawing 
Because it is analogous to a technical drawing,304 the design 
drawing component of a CAD file will be copyrightable under the 
                                                                                                     
 301. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 
1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (determining that anything not necessary to the 
purpose of the work is copyrightable expression); Synercom Tech. v. Univ. 
Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013–14 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (concluding that 
sequencing and ordering of a program is never copyrightable expression). 
 302. See supra notes 269–76 and accompanying text (explaining the test 
from Altai in detail). 
 303. See Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“The game consists of three separate components: the game engine, the source 
art library and the MAP files . . . The MAP file describes the level in painstaking 
detail, but it does not actually contain any of the copyrighted art itself . . . .”). 
 304. See supra Part VI.A.1.b (developing the analogy between technical 
drawings and the design drawing component of a CAD file). 
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same rules as any pictorial, graphical, or sculptural work.305 
Under § 102(a) of the Copyright Act, “pictorial, graphical, and 
sculptural works” constitute a “work of authorship,” which to be 
copyrightable must be “original” and “fixed in any tangible 
medium.”306 Section 102(a) goes on to further explain the fixation 
requirement by stating that the tangible medium must be such 
that the work “can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.”307 As a digital file, a CAD file is fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression; it can be perceived, reproduced, and 
communicated using a computer.308 Therefore, the 
copyrightability of a CAD file’s design drawing component rests 
on its originality. 
Original works of authorship require “independent creation” 
and “a modicum of creativity.”309 Because the creativity threshold 
is low,310 the drawing component of any CAD file depicting a 
                                                                                                     
 305. See Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F. 
Supp. 2d 753, 758 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (“Graphic works, including technical 
drawings, are among the works that are eligible for copyright protection.” (citing 
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2012))). 
 306. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (providing further that the medium can be 
“now known or later developed”). 
 307. Id. 
 308. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(determining that the plaintiff’s computer files, which were saved on CD-ROMs, 
were fixed in a tangible medium); Ethan Preston & John Lofton, Computer 
Security Publications: Information Economics, Shifting Liability, and the First 
Amendment, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 71, 120 (2002) (“Many works, such as texts, 
drawings, or other files that are produced by humans and saved as files onto 
computer systems, qualify for copyright.”); cf. Gregory Kent Laughlin, Who 
Owns the Copyright to Faculty-Created Web Sites?: The Work-for-Hire Doctrine’s 
Applicability to Internet Resources Created for Distance Learning and 
Traditional Classroom Courses, 41 B.C. L. REV. 549, 563 (2000) (“Such [website] 
files are fixed in a ‘tangible medium of expression,’ namely an Internet server’s 
hard drive, ‘from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated . . . with the aid of a machine o[r] device,’ that is, by retrieval of a 
copy of the computer file or files.”); Jeremiah A. Armstrong, Comment, The 
Digital Era of Photography Requires Streamlined Licensing and Rights 
Management, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 785, 787 (2007) (“Therefore, a 
photographic image is fixed whether the media is film, negative, print, or 
computer-readable digital file.”). 
 309. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
 310. See id. at 345 (positing that almost any work possesses “some creative 
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wholly novel—and therefore necessarily independently created—
design would be copyrightable.311 Originality, then, potentially 
poses problems only for 3D-scanned designs312 and user-rendered 
designs of preexisting works.313 Insofar as “a work may be 
original even though it closely resembles other works so long as 
the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying,”314 a 3D-
scanned CAD file fails to meet the independent creation criterion 
for originality because the 3D scanner literally copies the work by 
measuring its exact dimensions and creating a virtual model.315 
For similar reasons, a user-created CAD drawing that depicts a 
previously existing copyrighted work will not meet the originality 
requirement if it “present[s] in substantial and sufficient degree” 
                                                                                                     
spark”). 
 311. Compare Eales v. Envtl. Lifestyles, Inc., 958 F.2d 876, 879–80 (9th Cir. 
1992) (concluding that the plaintiff’s floor plans satisfied the originality 
requirement and were therefore copyrightable), with How to Create Your Own 
Custom 3D Printed iPhone Case, INSTRUCTABLES, http://www.instructables.com/ 
id/How-to-create-your-own-3D-Printed-iPhone-Case-from/ (last visited Jan. 31, 
2014) [hereinafter How to Create] (including a sample CAD drawing with two-
dimensional front, back, and side views) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). The two dimensional portion of the CAD drawing is the bare 
minimum. Unlike floor plans, CAD drawings generally are elaborate virtual 3D 
models. See, e.g., The Wired 3D Print-off, supra note 26 (providing examples of 
3D-rendered CAD files). 
 312. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining how a CAD file 
can comprise images scanned from a 3D scanner); infra Part VI.B.1 (discussing 
whether 3D-scanned CAD files are independently copyrightable derivative 
works). 
 313. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (describing CAD files that depict Iron 
Man and characters from Star Wars); infra Part VI.B.1 (discussing whether 3D-
scanned CAD files are independently copyrightable derivative works). 
 314. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 315. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 
1266–68 (10th Cir. 2008) (determining that Meshwerks’s virtual models of 
Toyota cars failed the originality requirement and were therefore not 
copyrightable because “the end-results were unadorned images of Toyota’s 
vehicles, the appearances of which do not owe their origins to Meshwerks”); cf. 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 142, § 2.08[E][2] (“[A] photograph of a 
photograph or other printed matter [is not original if it] amounts to nothing 
more than a slavish copying.”). But see SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 
117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (determining that the plaintiff’s 
photographs of the defendant’s picture frames did meet the originality 
requirement because of the plaintiff’s creative process and exercise of 
“significant aesthetic judgment” in composing the photos). 
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a copyrighted work.316 Only if the prior work is in the public 
domain (absent a fair use defense) could a CAD drawing 
depicting that work be copyrightable.317 Finally, an adept 
programmer could conceivably write code for a 3D-printable 
object without creating a design drawing. In such a case, there 
would obviously be no copyrightable drawing component of the 
CAD file. 
Insofar as the drawing component of a CAD file depicting an 
original design would be copyrightable as a technical drawing, 
the copyright protection in the drawing component would extend 
only to the drawing itself.318 Unlike copyrights in architectural 
plans, copyrights in other technical drawings do not afford 
protection to the work that the drawing depicts.319 Copyrightable 
CAD drawings’ protection might, however, extend to 3D-printed 
objects as derivative works.320 
b. Determine the Copyrightability of the Code Component 
Determining the copyrightability of a CAD file’s code 
component consists of two inquiries. First, one must determine 
whether the code is attributable to the CAD designer.321 Second, 
                                                                                                     
 316. Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 
1963). 
 317. See id. (“[I]t is . . . originality which entitles plaintiff . . . in the . . . 
presentation of material whether new or old. As to what is old, only the common 
source, not the copyrighted work, except as to fair use, may be resorted to by all, 
for only the old lies in the public domain.”). 
 318. Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F. 
Supp. 2d 753, 760 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (allowing a pleading that asserted that “the 
Plaintiff’s copyright protects the design drawing from being copied . . . [and] 
claim[ed] for copyright infringement as to the copies (as distinct from the actual 
trailer)”). 
 319. See Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 434–36 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2003)  (refusing to extend protection in a technical drawing of a medicine 
cabinet to the physical cabinets because of the useful article doctrine, despite 
the AWCPA’s extension of similar protection to architectural works). 
 320. See infra Part VI.B.2 (discussing whether 3D-printed objects are 
protectable as derivative works of the CAD files from which they were printed). 
 321. See supra Part VI.A.1.d (explaining how the code component of a CAD 
file might be attributable to the software programmer instead of the CAD 
designer). 
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one must determine whether the code itself is copyrightable 
under the filtration portion of the abstraction–filtration–
comparison test.322 
CAD files present a unique question of authorship because, 
unlike other computer-generated works in which any code only 
contributes to the creation of the work itself, an integral 
component of the CAD file itself is the code that allows it to print 
a 3D object.323 The code component of a CAD file seems to fall 
somewhere in between computer-generated works such as 
Microsoft Word documents, for which the copyright holder is 
clearly the user of the program, and video game outputs, which 
the courts have found to be the work of the programmer.324 In a 
1986 article, Professor Pamela Samuelson posited that the 
copyrights in computer-generated works would be attributable to 
programs themselves rather than the users if and only if 
“computer-generated works incorporate recognizable blocks of 
expression from the underlying programs, and do so in a manner 
that cannot be a fair use of the underlying program.”325 Applying 
Samuelson’s rule to 3D printing, the code component of a CAD 
file would be attributable to the user unless the code in the CAD 
file contained recognizable blocks of code from the program itself. 
Whether such blocks are recognizable will depend on the CAD 
software itself and how the programmer chose to express the 
code.326 If a CAD file was created with surface modeling software 
and consists of minimal pieces of code—representing, for 
                                                                                                     
 322. See supra notes 271–76 (describing the standards of the filtration 
component of the abstraction–filtration–comparison test). 
 323. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining the crucial role of 
the code component in a CAD file). 
 324. See supra notes 287–90 and accompanying text (detailing the two sides 
of this spectrum of authorship). 
 325. Pamela Samuelson, The Future of Software Protection: Allocating 
Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1215 
(1986). Despite positing that a programmer could not claim authorship over a 
computer-generated work created with his program only if no fair use could be 
asserted by the user, Professor Samuelson doubts whether fair use “would have 
any applicability to the computer-generated work problem.” Id. at 1215 n.122. 
 326. See id. at 1215 (“In general, computer-generated works do not 
incorporate recognizable blocks of expression from the underlying 
program . . . .”). 
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example, individual pixels—arranged in distinct combinations 
depending on the user’s manipulations of the software, the code 
would likely be attributable to the user.327 If, however, the 
programmer expressed code in large chunks corresponding with 
premade shapes in a solid modeling program, such code would 
likely not be attributable to the user.328 Even if the code does 
comprise recognizable building blocks, it may still be attributable 
to the user if the employment of those blocks constitutes fair 
use.329 
If the code component of a CAD file is attributable to the 
designer, the courts should apply the filtration portion of the 
abstraction–filtration–comparison test from Altai.330 One might 
argue that after Lotus, it is inappropriate to use the abstraction–
filtration–comparison test.331 In that case, the court decided not 
to apply the abstraction–filtration–comparison test to a “menu 
tree” in the plaintiff’s software because “abstracting menu 
command hierarchies down to their individual word and menu 
levels and then filtering idea from expression at that stage, as 
both the Altai and the district court tests require, obscures the 
more fundamental question of whether a menu command 
                                                                                                     
 327. See 3D for Everyone, SKETCHUP, http://www.sketchup.com/ (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2014) (offering surface modeling CAD software that allows for more 
freehand design) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 328. See Tinkercad, supra note 283 (allowing a user to create designs with 
pre-rendered shapes). Because solid modeling software arose in the industrial 
manufacturing context, and because the useful article doctrine precludes 
copyrightability for utilitarian (and, often, industrial) objects, it is noteworthy, 
although not legally significant, that CAD files created with solid modeling 
software are less likely to be copyrightable. See LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 
16, at 93 (describing the industrial- and manufacturing-based origins of solid 
modeling CAD software). It is likewise noteworthy that CAD files created with 
surface modeling software, which “grew up in the midst of animators and 
illustrators,” are more likely to be copyrightable. Id. at 94.  
 329. See Samuelson, supra note 325, at 1215 (arguing that work using 
recognizable blocks of a program may be attributable to the user unless he 
incorporates them “in a manner that cannot be fair use of the underlying 
program”).   
 330. See supra notes 271–76 and accompanying text (describing the 
filtration portion of the test). 
 331. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 814 (1st Cir. 
1995) (determining that the court need not apply the Altai test if the menu tree 
at issue was a noncopyrightable method of operation from the start). 
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hierarchy can be copyrighted at all.”332 Based on that logic, one 
might construe a CAD file’s code to be an integral part of the 
noncopyrightable process by which a 3D printer operates.333 But, 
as Professor Mark Lemley argues, “[t]his argument seems to 
misunderstand the Altai test.”334 Instead of rejecting the 
abstraction–filtration–comparison test, the First Circuit was 
actually engaging in the test’s abstraction step.335 Because the 
question at hand is whether the code—rather than the process—
is copyrightable, it is appropriate to apply the filtration step of 
the abstraction–filtration–comparison test. 
The filtration step deems “elements dictated by efficiency,” 
“elements dictated by external factors,” and “elements taken from 
the public domain” to be noncopyrightable.336 Such an inquiry will 
depend on the code of a given CAD file created in a given CAD 
program, but it is possible to make some general observations. 
First, CAD file code is likely to contain elements that are not 
dictated by efficiency—those elements than can be expressed in 
“most succinct mathematical computation”337—because each CAD 
program will likely have its own way of organizing its particular 
building blocks of premade code. Second, CAD file code is likely to 
encounter problems with the second step of filtration—external 
factors—because the building blocks of premade code and the 
sequence in which they appear will likely be dictated in part by 
                                                                                                     
 332. Id. at 815. 
 333. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (providing no copyright protection for an 
“idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery”). 
 334. Lemley, supra note 85, at 21. 
 335. See id. at 22 
[P]roper application of the Altai approach in this context would 
identify the menu command hierarchy as the level of abstraction at 
which copying was alleged, and would then proceed to decide what if 
anything was copyrightable at that level.  
Of course, this is in effect precisely what the Lotus court did, although when it 
reached the “filtration” step, it determined that the entire program was 
unprotectable at the menu command hierarchy level. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815. 
 336. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–10 (2d Cir. 
1992); see also supra notes 272–76 (detailing each portion of the filtration step).  
 337. Altai, 982 F.2d at 708. 
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the CAD program itself.338 Even if the user’s actions ultimately 
determine the precise combination of building blocks of code 
based on his design, the blocks will be arranged according to 
directives in the program. Finally, any elements of code not 
discarded by any of the three steps of filtration would be 
copyrightable.339 Therefore, even if certain elements of a CAD 
file’s code might be dictated by efficiency or external factors, or 
taken from the public domain, any elements that pass through 
the filter are copyrightable. While authorship issues might 
preclude copyrightability of code created in certain CAD 
programs, and although many elements of a CAD file’s code will 
likely be noncopyrightable elements dictated by external factors, 
some CAD file code may be copyrightable. 
c. Consider Whether the Design Drawing’s Expression Has Merged 
with the Idea of the Noncopyrightable Code 
Given that CAD files serve a particular purpose—to send 
instructions to a 3D printer—it is not enough to merely 
determine whether each component of the CAD file is 
copyrightable. Instead, one must determine through the useful 
article doctrine340 or the merger of idea and expression341 whether 
                                                                                                     
 338. See id. at 709–10 (listing as external factors mechanical specifications 
of computers, compatibility requirements of other programs, manufacturers’ 
design standards, demands of the industry being serviced, and widely accepted 
programming practices). Although Altai did not expressly list CAD file code’s 
dependence on the CAD software, it seems appropriate to infer that the 
limitations of the software on the file would constitute “external limitations.” 
One reason that the list in Altai does not include this limitation is that Altai 
dealt specifically with the copyrightability of the program itself, instead of a file 
created with that program. See id. at 698 (describing the computer program at 
issue).  
 339. See id. at 707 (explaining that the filtration step is a method “for 
separating protectable expression from non-protectable material”). 
 340. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“[T]he design of a useful article . . . shall be 
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent 
that, such design incorporates . . . features that can be identified separately 
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the 
article.”). 
 341. See Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 
606 (1st Cir. 1988) (“When there is essentially only one way to express an idea, 
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the copyrightable elements of the CAD file are negated by its 
overall function. The first two steps of this test produce a number 
of possible results. Both the design drawing and the entirety of 
the code component may be copyrightable.342 In this case, the 
CAD file would be protected in both respects because there would 
be no component embodying the idea or utility with which the 
expression could have merged. It is also possible that neither 
component is copyrightable, in which case the CAD file obviously 
would not be protected. Additionally, there could be copyrightable 
code without a copyrightable drawing.343 If this is the case, then 
the third part of the test would be redundant because part of the 
filtration step from the Altai test is to conduct a merger 
inquiry.344 This final step of the test therefore considers the most 
likely scenario: that there is a copyrightable design drawing and 
at least some noncopyrightable code. This subsection first 
explains why the appropriate inquiry concerns the idea–
expression dichotomy instead of the useful article doctrine. It 
then discusses the situations in which a CAD file would either 
survive or fail the merger inquiry. 
                                                                                                     
the idea and its expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to copying 
that expression.”); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 
1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work would 
be the work’s idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or 
function would be part of the expression of the idea.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 342. See supra notes 309–17, 336–39, and accompanying text (providing the 
standards and analysis for the copyrightability of the design drawing and code 
components). Although it is possible, it is highly unlikely that the code aspect of 
the CAD file would be copyrightable in its entirety. See supra note 338 and 
accompanying text (explaining the problems that CAD file code is likely to 
encounter at the “elements dictated by external factors” step of filtration). 
 343. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text (describing how 3D-
scanned CAD drawings and CAD designs based on preexisting copyrighted 
works would not be copyrightable). 
 344. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–09 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (using a merger inquiry to determine which elements of the program 
in question were “dictated by efficiency”). 
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i. The Useful Article Doctrine Versus the Idea–Expression 
Dichotomy 
Before applying the third part of the test to CAD files, it is 
important to explain why a useful article doctrine inquiry would 
be inferior to an idea–expression dichotomy inquiry in 
determining whether a CAD file’s function precludes 
copyrightability.345 First, § 101 of the Copyright Act excludes 
from its definition of “useful articles” those pictorial, graphical, 
and sculptural works that “convey information.”346 Because “the 
intrinsic purpose of a design drawing is merely to convey 
information, the drawing itself is not a useful article under the 
Act.”347 Although CAD files differ from other design drawings by 
communicating through code to a 3D printer rather than 
conveying information to a human being, courts have found that 
computer code still conveys information.348  
                                                                                                     
 345. But see Weinberg, What’s the Deal?, supra note 25, at 16–17 (advocating 
a useful article “severability” analysis for user-rendered CAD drawings of useful 
articles). When Weinberg does consider the doctrine of merger, he does so only 
on the level of design drawings without acknowledging CAD files’ code 
components. Id. at 15, n.46. Furthermore, Weinberg mentions merger in the 
body of the article only in the context of the useful article doctrine. See id. at 14 
(“[D]esigns are only protected by copyright to the extent that they go beyond the 
utilitarian requirements of designing a useful article.”); id. at 19 (“[A]ctual 
copyrightability [for a CAD file of a useful object] will turn on merger 
analysis.”). 
 346. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 347. Gusler v. Fischer, 580 F. Supp. 2d 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); accord 
Eales v. Envtl. Lifestyles, Inc., 958 F.2d 876, 879–80 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The 
intrinsic function of an architectural plan is to convey the information necessary 
to enable the reader to construct a building.”). 
 348. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 448 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“Instructions such as computer code, which are intended to be executable 
by a computer, will often convey information capable of comprehension and 
assessment by a human being.”). The question of whether computer code 
conveys information has not yet made it to the courts in the copyright context. 
Instead, Corley considers the issue in the context of the First Amendment. See 
id. at 445 (considering “whether computer code is speech”). The court concluded 
that “[c]omputer programs are not exempted from the category of First 
Amendment speech simply because their instructions require use of a computer. 
A recipe is no less ‘speech’ because it calls for the use of an oven, and a musical 
score is no less ‘speech’ because it specifies performance on an electric guitar.” 
Id. at 447. Similarly, one can infer that a CAD file, like a technical drawing, 
primarily conveys information and is therefore not a useful article under the 
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Furthermore, even if CAD files did not fit the “convey 
information” exception, their design drawings would be 
copyrightable notwithstanding the useful article doctrine if they 
were physically or conceptually separable from the code 
component.349 As one can discover by conducting a simple Google 
Image search for “3D printing CAD file,”350 a CAD file’s drawing 
component is physically separable from its functional code 
component.351 Although a useful article need be either physically 
or conceptually separable,352 CAD drawings would likely be 
conceptually separable as well. CAD files would likely pass the 
temporal displacement test353 insofar as a CAD drawing of an 
artistic object would “engender[] a non-utilitarian concept 
without at the same time engendering the concept of a utilitarian 
function.”354 Similarly, they would pass the Goldstein test, which 
is essentially a mental version of the physical separability test.355 
This leaves only Professor Denicola’s test.356 
                                                                                                     
Copyright Act. 
 349. See Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (“[T]he crucial issue in determining their copyrightability is whether 
they possess artistic or aesthetic features that are physically or conceptually 
separable from their utilitarian dimension.”). 




(last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (containing images of CAD drawings, which one can 
save in JPEG format, thereby separating the image from its code component) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 351. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(explaining that to be physically separable, the aesthetic elements must be 
“capable of existing as a work of art independent of the utilitarian article into 
which they were incorporated”). 
 352. See Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 420 (“The Report states that the article must 
contain ‘some element that physically or conceptually, can be identified as 
separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-
1476, at 55 (1976))). 
 353. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text (describing the 
temporal displacement test). 
 354. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 423. 
 355. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text (describing Professor 
Goldstein’s test). 
 356. See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text (describing Professor 
Denicola’s test). 
654 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 591 (2014) 
A CAD file might fail Professor Denicola’s test, which 
precludes copyrightability “if design elements reflect a merger of 
aesthetic and functional considerations.”357 But because the 
utilitarian elements of CAD computer code are its “idea,”358 the 
Denicola test in the context of CAD files is essentially the same 
as an idea–expression dichotomy merger inquiry.359 Given that 
CAD drawings otherwise survive the useful article doctrine, an 
idea–expression merger inquiry, which applies not only to useful 
articles but to all works,360 would better address the Denicola 
test’s concerns. 
ii. Applying the Idea–Expression Dichotomy to CAD Files 
Whether or not the expression from a CAD drawing will 
merge with the idea of its noncopyrightable code will depend on 
the drawing itself. The doctrine of merger posits that “‘when 
there is essentially only one way to express an idea, the idea and 
its expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to copying 
that expression.’ Under these circumstances, the expression is 
said to have ‘merged’ with the idea itself. . . . [S]uch expression 
                                                                                                     
 357. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
 358. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 
(3d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the 
work’s idea . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
 359. See PATRY, supra note 115, § 3:141 (arguing that the Denicola test 
adopted in Brandir “confuses conceptual separability with the idea–expression 
doctrine of Section 102(b)”). Compare Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145 (“[I]f design 
elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic 
aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the 
utilitarian elements. Conversely, where design elements can be identified as 
reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised independently of functional 
influences, conceptual separability exists.”), with Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. 
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[A] court must inquire ‘whether 
the use of this particular set of modules is necessary efficiently to implement 
that part of the program’s process’ being implemented. If the answer is yes, then 
the expression represented by the programmer’s choice . . . has merged with 
their underlying idea and is unprotected.”). 
 360. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880) (using the idea–expression 
dichotomy to delineate between the realms of copyright and patent law). 
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should not be protected.”361 Moreover, expression that is a 
“necessary incident” to the idea has merged.362 Because CAD files 
function as a set of instructions for 3D printers, that purpose 
“would be the work’s idea, and everything that is not necessary to 
that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the 
idea.”363 If the noncopyrightable code embodies the purpose of the 
CAD file,364 then the design drawing component of a CAD file will 
have merged to the extent that it creates the code used to produce 
the 3D-printed object.365 Because CAD software creates the coded 
instructions as the user designs the object,366 and because the 
software sends the design to the 3D printer in 2D cross-sectional 
slices,367 “necessarily incidental” CAD files would be those that 
portray the design in two-dimensional cross-sections or in two 
dimensions from multiple perspectives.368 Although the 
                                                                                                     
 361. Altai, 982 F.2d at 707–08 (quoting Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn 
Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
 362. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103. 
 363. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 
(3d Cir. 1986). 
 364. See supra notes 336–39 and accompanying text (discussing how code 
could be dictated by efficiency and thus constitute a noncopyrightable idea). 
 365. Cf. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 
(2d Cir. 1987) (positing that for purposes of the useful article doctrine, the 
aesthetic and functional elements have merged when the former were designed 
with the latter in mind). 
 366. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (explaining how the code 
portion of the CAD file serves its function in the 3D-printing process). 
 367. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing how CAD 
software deconstructs the image into two-dimensional cross-sections). 
 368. See, e.g., How to Create, supra note 311 (providing an example of a CAD 
file consisting of two-dimensional drawings from multiple angles). Similarly, in 
Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, the defendant argued 
that the plaintiff’s two-dimensional floor plans of a recreational vehicle failed a 
merger inquiry. See Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 
753 F. Supp. 2d 753, 761 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (“Thus, protection of a two-
dimensional drawing in comparative advertising would, the Defendant argues, 
lead effectively to according protection to the idea itself.”). The court explained 
that the standard for such an inquiry would be “not how many alternative 
methods of expression actually exist, but ‘whether other options practically exist 
under the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 536 (6th Cir. 2004)). The court, however, 
concluded that the merger question was “not best undertaken in the context of a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Id. 
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blueprints in Eales survived the idea–expression dichotomy, 
those plans did not include step-by-step instructions and so did 
not have to survive a merger inquiry.369 In this way, CAD 
drawings are more like recipes, which are copyrightable only if 
they contain sufficiently expressive elements.370 In the context of 
CAD files, such basic two-dimensional drawings like those in 
Eales would not be sufficiently expressive to escape merger. 
Likewise, if a user creates a design drawing mainly from pre-
rendered shapes in a solid modeling program,371 then the design 
is more likely to be necessarily incidental to the noncopyrightable 
code because each shape used will correspond with larger 
preprogrammed blocks of code.372 On the other hand, CAD 
drawings that depict elaborate freehand 3D models created with 
surface modeling software373 will likely survive the merger 
inquiry because they include more than the minimum amount of 
expression to create the code that a 3D printer will use to produce 
a 3D object.374 Ultimately, however, courts will have to determine 
                                                                                                     
 369. See Eales v. Envtl. Lifestyles, Inc., 958 F.2d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“Eales’ plans laid out the location and sizes of numerous features of model 
home #3, and thus her ideas were ‘fixed’ in tangible form. That is all the 
copyright code requires. Eales won damages because defendants copied the 
plans she drew, not the idea she created.” (citations omitted)). 
 370. See Barbour v. Head, 178 F. Supp. 2d 758, 764 (S.D. Tex. 2002) 
(recognizing the possibility that a recipe could contain elements “sufficiently 
expressive to exceed the boundaries of mere fact”). 
 371. See, e.g., Tinkercad, supra note 283 (allowing users to create CAD 
drawings by selecting and manipulating pre-rendered shapes); see also supra 
note 41 and accompanying text (explaining solid modeling software). 
 372. Cf. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 715 (2d Cir. 
1992) (approving the district court’s finding that “this aspect of the [plaintiff’s] 
program’s structure was dictated by the nature of other programs with which it 
was designed to interact and, thus, is not protected by copyright”). But see 
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 
1986) (“Where there are various means of achieving the desired purpose, then 
the particular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is 
expression, not idea.”). 
 373. See The Wired 3D Print-off, supra note 26 (providing examples of 
“original, printable” designs for a contest such as “a heart [pendant] created by 
365 smaller hearts,” “a three legged robot with a mini cannon,” and “a 
Christmas ornament of a snowflake trapped within an intricate hollow star 
cage”); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining surface 
modeling software). 
 374. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 (“Where there are various means of 
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whether a CAD drawing’s expression has merged with the idea of 
its noncopyrightable code on a case-by-case basis.375 
In the absence of a perfect analog for CAD files, courts will be 
left with two options: they might try to pick the analog that 
represents the best fit, or they could adopt a special test for CAD 
files. While simply choosing an existing analog would necessarily 
ignore a critical component of the CAD file,376 the test proposed in 
this Note accounts for both the design drawing and computer 
code components of a CAD file while ensuring that the design 
component will not be copyrightable if it merges with the 
noncopyrightable code embodying the CAD file’s purpose as 
instructions for a 3D printer. 
B. Derivative Works and 3D Printing in Light of the Composite 
Test for Copyrightability of CAD Files 
Copyright protects the author’s exclusive right not only to 
make and distribute copies of his work377 but also to “prepare 
derivative works based on the copyrighted work.”378 Furthermore, 
derivative works are relevant in copyright infringement cases 
because a defendant can assert the fair use defense to otherwise 
infringing uses of derivative works as well as uses of the original 
copyrighted works.379 Future infringement actions involving 3D 
                                                                                                     
achieving the desired purpose, then the particular means chosen is not 
necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea.”). 
 375. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 
(2d Cir. 1960) (positing that differentiating copyrightable expression from 
noncopyrightable idea will “inevitably be ad hoc”). 
 376. See supra Part VI.A.1.b–d (discussing how using technical drawings as 
an analog ignores the function that CAD files serve as a set of instructions but 
how using recipes or computer programs as an analog ignores the design 
drawing component). 
 377. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2012) (granting the author of a copyrighted 
work the exclusive rights to “reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . . [and] 
to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other 
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”). 
 378. Id. § 106(2). 
 379. See, e.g., Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112–14 (9th Cir. 
1998) (analyzing the defendant’s assertion of fair use of the plaintiff’s video 
game in the distribution of otherwise infringing derivative works). 
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printing will therefore likely involve derivative works. The 
inquiry in terms of 3D printing is twofold. First it will be 
necessary to determine whether a work might infringe an 
author’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works.380 To do so 
one must determine whether the new work is transformative of a 
preexisting work.381 The preexisting work must be 
copyrightable,382 and the new work must only transform the 
preexisting work in terms of content.383 Second, it is necessary to 
determine in light of the composite test for copyrightability of 
CAD files384 whether the various aspects of 3D printing might be 
independently protectable derivative works.385 This subpart 
examines whether each of the following qualifies as an 
independently copyrightable or infringing derivative work: CAD 
files as derivatives of copyrightable works; 3D-printed objects as 
derivatives of CAD files; and 3D-printed objects as derivatives of 
copyrightable works. 
1. CAD Files as Derivatives of Preexisting Copyrightable Works 
When discussing whether CAD files are derivative works, it 
is necessary to separate CAD files into two different categories: 
                                                                                                     
 380. See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria 
for a work that infringes on an author’s derivative work right). 
 381. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a derivative work as a “work based upon 
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may 
be recast, transformed, or adapted”). 
 382. See Ets-Hoken v. Skyy Spirits, 225 F.3d 1068, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“Under the Copyright Act, a work is not a ‘derivative work’ unless it is ‘based 
upon one or more preexisting works’ and, in order to qualify as a ‘preexisting 
work,’ the underlying work must be copyrightable.”). 
 383. See supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text (expounding on 
Professor Reese’s argument that the transformativeness requirement for 
derivative works differs from the transformativeness element of the first fair 
use factor). 
 384. See supra Part VI.A.2 (devising the composite test for copyrightability 
of CAD files). 
 385. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text (discussing the how the 
requirements for independent copyrightability of derivative works is the same 
as those for original works). 
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3D-scanned CAD files and user-rendered CAD files based on 
preexisting works.386 In both cases, the CAD file must be based on 
a preexisting copyrightable work.387 Thus, CAD files depicting the 
torso mannequins from Barnhart or the bicycle rack from 
Brandir would not be derivative works because the preexisting 
works failed useful article analysis.388 Unlike the plaintiff’s 
photographs in SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc.,389 3D-
scanned CAD files do not “merely depict defendants’ [picture] 
frames [without] recast[ing], adapt[ing] or transform[ing] any 
authorship that may exist in the frames” because they add 
computer code instructions to the 3D model.390 Therefore, 3D-
scanned CAD files are sufficiently transformative to infringe on a 
preexisting work.391 User-rendered CAD files depicting 
preexisting works may be even more transformative in cases in 
which they add a new design element to the copyrighted work.392 
Because a work need not be independently copyrightable to 
                                                                                                     
 386. See supra notes 310–12 and accompanying text (treating separately 3D-
scanned and user-rendered CAD files for purposes of copyrightability). This 
Note does not discuss CAD files depicting wholly original designs because, as 
original designs, they are by definition not based on a preexisting work.  
 387. See supra note 382 and accompanying text (rehashing the “preexisting 
work” requirement). 
 388. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 
1148–49 (2d Cir. 1987) (determining that the artistic elements of the bicycle 
rack at issue were not conceptually separable from its function); Carol Barnhart, 
Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that any 
aesthetic elements of the torso mannequins at stake were “inextricably 
intertwined” with their utility). 
 389. 117 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 390. Id. at 306. This Note compares 3D-scanned CAD files to SHL Imaging 
in the section on copyrightability, arguing in that section that 3D-scanned files 
were mere copies of the objects that they scanned. Supra note 315 and 
accompanying text. In that context, however, the question was whether the 
design drawing was original as part of the composite test. The code is not 
irrelevant to the 3D-scanned CAD file except in that context. 
 391. See Reese, supra note 131, at 494 (requiring only a transformation of 
content to satisfy the transformativeness requirement for derivative works).  
 392. See, e.g., Hurst, supra note 153 (describing how HBO sent a cease and 
desist letter to an individual who designed a CAD file for an iPhone dock 
resembling the Iron Throne from the Game of Thrones television series); cf. 
Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(determining that the defendant’s computer animation of a diver created with 
the plaintiff’s photograph infringed on the plaintiff’s derivative work right). 
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infringe on an author’s right to prepare derivative works, any 
CAD file that satisfies these inquiries and is substantially related 
to the underlying work such that the new work would otherwise 
infringe on the preexisting work393 would be sufficiently 
derivative to infringe on the preexisting work.394 
In order to warrant independent copyright protection, 
however, a derivative work must meet the same originality 
standard as an independently created work.395 Therefore, the 
question of whether and to what extent derivative CAD files are 
independently copyrightable will depend on whether and to what 
extent the CAD file passes the composite test for copyrightability 
articulated above.396 Under the Copyright Act, “[t]he subject 
matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes . . . 
derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting 
material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part 
of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.”397 
Thus, a 3D-scanned CAD file that might not be sufficiently 
original to gain independent protection as a derivative work in 
terms of its design drawing element might still achieve 
independent protection regarding its copyrightable code.398 
Likewise, a user-rendered derivative CAD file might be 
independently copyrightable in terms of its original design 
                                                                                                     
 393. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 142, § 3.01 (explaining how a work 
will be derivative “only if [the new work] would be considered an infringing 
work if the material which it has derived from a preexisting work had been 
taken without the consent of a copyright proprietor of such preexisting work”). 
 394. See Goldstein, Derivative Rights, supra note 149, at 231 n.75 (“[T]he 
Act does not require that the derivative work be protectable for its preparation 
to infringe.”). 
 395. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 1266 
n.7 (10th Cir. 2008) (establishing the same originality standard for derivative 
works as that for any copyrightable work). 
 396. See supra Part VI.A.2 (positing that one can determine the 
copyrightability of a CAD file by examining separately the copyrightability of 
the design drawing element and the code element, and then analyzing—if 
applicable—whether the expression of the design drawing has merged with the 
idea of any noncopyrightable code).  
 397. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012). 
 398. See supra note 390 (discussing how 3D-scanned CAD files fail the 
originality requirement only in terms of the design drawing element, but are not 
necessarily unoriginal regarding their code). 
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elements and its code. Where a derivate work is copyrightable, 
though, the copyrightability of the derivative works does not alter 
the scope or duration of the preexisting copyright; the copied 
elements of the derivative works are not protectable.399 
2. 3D-Printed Objects as Derivatives of CAD Files 
The composite test for copyrightability of CAD files is relevant 
in a different way in the context of 3D-printed objects as 
derivatives. Insofar as a derivative work must be based on a 
preexisting copyrightable work,400 a 3D-printed object will not 
infringe on the CAD file designer’s right to prepare derivative 
works unless at least some element of the CAD file passes the 
composite test for copyrightability.401 Furthermore, the 
transformation from two to three dimensions will be sufficient to 
constitute an infringing derivative work.402 But courts have limited 
the scope of infringing derivative works. Despite plaintiffs holding 
valid copyrights on technical drawings, courts have refused to hold 
defendants’ medicine cabinets,403 recreational vehicles,404 and car-
                                                                                                     
 399. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b)  
The copyright in a . . . derivative work extends only to the material 
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the 
preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any 
exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such 
work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, 
duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the 
preexisting material. 
 400. See supra note 382 and accompanying text (describing the requirement 
that the preexisting work off of which the derivative work is based be 
copyrightable). 
 401. See supra Part VI.A.2 (setting forth the test). 
 402. See Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 
1980) (acknowledging that the plaintiff’s toys of Disney’s two-dimensionally 
drawn characters constitute derivative works). 
 403. See Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 435–36 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2003) (determining that copyrights in technical drawings of medicine 
cabinets did not extend to the cabinets themselves). 
 404. See Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F. 
Supp. 2d 753, 760 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (noting that the defendant’s construction of 
recreational vehicles based on the plaintiff’s design did not constitute 
infringement of the plaintiff’s technical drawings).  
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manufacturing machinery405 to infringe on the plaintiffs’ derivative 
works rights because “when a plaintiff holds a copyright in a 
graphic drawing of a useful article, others are not precluded from 
manufacturing and marketing the article itself.”406 The exception 
makes sense because if otherwise noncopyrightable useful 
articles407 constructed from copyrightable design drawings 
infringed on the designer’s right to prepare derivative works, then 
the designer could achieve backdoor copyright protection for types 
of works that Congress intended to relegate to patent law.408 
Whereas a useful article itself is not copyrightable,409 a 
manufacturer could—without this rule—create a copyrightable 
CAD drawing of the useful article and then acquire protection of 
the 3D-printed useful article as a derivative work for a 
significantly longer period of time than that granted by patent.410 
Thus, in addition to the composite test for copyrightability, 
whether a 3D-printed object infringes on a CAD designer’s 
                                                                                                     
 405. Niemi v. Am. Axle Mfg. & Holding, Inc., No. 05-74210, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 50153, at *9 (E.D. Mich. July 24, 2006) (“[T]he manufacture of a machine 
from a copyrighted technical drawing is clearly not copyright infringement.”). 
 406. Forest River, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 758. 
 407. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (providing that a useful article is not 
copyrightable unless its design “incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article”). 
 408. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) (“[T]he Committee is seeking to 
draw as clear a line as possible between copyrightable works of applied art and 
uncopyrighted works of industrial design.”); Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome, 
supra note 24 (“This could create a type of quasi-patent system, without the 
requirement for novelty or the strictly limited period of protection. Useful 
objects could be protected for decades after creation. Mechanical and functional 
innovation could be frozen by fears of massive copyright infringement 
lawsuits.”). 
 409. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this 
section, shall be [copyright-eligible] only if, and only to the extent that, such 
design incorporates [copyrightable] features that can be identified separately 
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the 
article.”). 
 410. Compare id. § 302 (a), (c) (granting copyright protection for the life of 
the author plus seventy years or in the case of an anonymous author or a work 
for hire, “95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years 
from the year of its creation, whichever expires first”), with 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) 
(granting patent protection for a term of twenty years from the date that the 
application was filed). 
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derivative works right will depend on whether the 3D-printed 
object is a useful article. 
To warrant independent copyright as a derivative work, 
though, a 3D-printed object must still meet the originality 
requirement.411 In Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp.,412 the 
Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s wind-up toys of 
Disney characters did not represent independently copyrightable 
derivative works by rejecting 
the contention that the originality requirement of 
copyrightability can be satisfied by the mere reproduction of a 
work of art in a different medium, or by the demonstration of 
some “physical” as opposed to “artistic” skill. . . . Thus, the 
mere reproduction of the Disney characters in plastic, even 
though the adaptation of the preexisting works to this medium 
undoubtedly involved some degree of manufacturing skill, does 
not constitute originality as this Court has defined the term.413 
Under this formulation of originality, no derivative 3D-printed 
objects will be independently copyrightable because they will fail 
the originality requirement in some way. A 3D-printed object that 
is derivative of a 3D-scanned CAD file with no copyrightable code 
element will not be copyrightable because the 3D-printed object 
will not be based on a preexisting work.414 Furthermore, all 3D-
printed objects will not be independently copyrightable because 
insofar as they are based on a virtual drawing, they will 
constitute “no distinguishable variation from preexisting works, 
nothing recognizably the author’s own.”415 The only exception 
would be an instance in which a user programmed copyrightable 
coded instructions without using a design drawing.416 In that 
                                                                                                     
 411. See supra note 395 and accompanying text (explaining that a derivative 
work must meet the standard originality requirement to achieve independent 
copyrightability). 
 412. 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 413. Id. at 910 (internal citations omitted). 
 414. See supra note 398 and accompanying text (discussing how a 3D-
scanned CAD file requires a copyrightable code element to be independently 
copyrightable). 
 415. See Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 910.  
 416. See supra Part VI.A.2.a (advancing the possibility that “a particularly 
adept programmer could conceivably write code for a 3D-printable object 
without creating a design drawing”). 
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case, the derivative 3D-printed object could be independently 
copyrightable because the 3D object would be sufficiently original 
compared to the code. But these objects would still have to satisfy 
the copyrightability requirements for sculptural works.417 3D-
printed objects therefore face more rigorous standards than CAD 
files to achieve copyrightability as derivative works. 
3. 3D-Printed Objects as Derivatives of Preexisting Copyrighted 
Works 
The question of whether 3D-printed objects violate the 
derivative work right of copyrightable works or are themselves 
copyrightable derivative works depends on whether the 3D-
printed object is an exact depiction of the copyrighted work or if it 
adds original expression to a portion of the preexisting work. In 
the former case, the 3D-printed object cannot be a mere copy to be 
sufficiently transformative because there is no transformation in 
content.418 Furthermore, to be original and thus independently 
copyrightable, the work cannot make a trivial alteration—merely 
changing the size of a work while keeping the same dimensions, 
for example, is not enough.419  
                                                                                                     
 417. See supra note 210–211 and accompanying text (explaining how 3D-
printed objects would fall under the statutory category of “pictorial, graphical, 
and sculptural works”). 
 418. See supra notes 130–37 and accompanying text (expounding on 
Professor Reese’s assertion that transformativeness for derivative works 
requires only a transformation of content). From the perspective of 
infringement, the distinction between a copy and a derivative work seems 
academic—both infringe on the copyright holder’s rights under § 106. See 17 
U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive 
rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; [and] (2) to prepare derivative 
works based upon the copyrighted work . . . .”). But original elements of a 
derivative work are independently copyrightable. See id. § 103(a) (“The subject 
matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and 
derivative works . . . .”). If the derivative work is copyrightable, then the term of 
the copyright would begin at creation of the derivative work instead of the 
preexisting work and would therefore be protected for a longer period of time. 
See id. § 103(b) (“The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not 
affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright 
protection in the preexisting material.”). 
 419. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 1267 
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The analysis of 3D-printed objects as derivative works 
becomes more complicated, however, if the CAD file from which a 
3D object is printed is an independently copyrightable derivative 
work of the preexisting copyrighted work off of which it is based. 
The question becomes whether the 3D-printed object infringes on 
the derivative rights of the original work, the CAD file, or both. 
Judge Posner acknowledged this conceptual nightmare in Pickett 
v. Prince,420 tackling the issue of “[w]hether Prince’s guitar is a 
copy of his copyrighted symbol or a copy of Pickett’s guitar.”421 
His conclusion: this is “not a question that the methods of 
litigation can readily answer with confidence.”422 The Nimmers, 
however, disagree in their treatise, arguing that “[t]o the extent 
that the nature of the underlying work dictates that any slight 
change made by one copier must be the same as that made by 
another copier, that fact in itself should immunize the second 
copier from liability [to the first copier].”423 Under this standard, 
the 3D-printed object would infringe only on the derivative works 
right associated with the preexisting copyrighted work and not 
that of the CAD file because the 3D-printed object would 
necessarily be derivative of the same elements as the CAD file. 
As illustrated above, the issue of derivative works in the 
context of 3D printing, unlike the issue of copyrightability, does 
not necessarily require a new legal test. Rather, the difficulty for 
courts will be to parse, in light of the copyrightability test for 
CAD files, the many different relationships between derivative 
                                                                                                     
n.9 (10th Cir. 2008) (doubting after Feist—which determined that “sweat of the 
brow” does not constitute originality—that the Second Circuit’s ruling that a 
miniature reproduction of Rodin’s “Hand of God” was sufficiently original 
because of the level of skill required to reproduce it (citing Alva Studios, Inc. v. 
Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959))). 3D printing presents 
opportunities for other similar alterations. For example, one could theoretically 
reproduce Rodin’s “Hand of God” in hot pink plastic instead of white marble. 
The “mere reproduction of a work of art in a different medium,” however, is not 
sufficiently original. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (leaving open, admittedly, the question of whether a change of color is 
a mere “trivial variation”). 
 420. 207 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 421. Id. at 406. 
 422. Id.  
 423. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 142, § 3.03[A]. 
666 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 591 (2014) 
and underlying works, preexisting copyrightable works, CAD 
files, and 3D-printed objects. 
C. Whether Current Fair Use Doctrine Applies Adequately to 3D 
Printing 
Whereas issues of copyrightability and derivative works will 
be threshold questions in 3D printing infringement actions, fair 
use will be defendants’ primary defense.424 While Congress 
intended the four statutory fair use factors to be applied on a 
case-by-case basis,425 courts have done so increasingly in a 
mechanical fashion.426 Given the complex challenges that 3D 
printing poses to copyright, it is necessary to question whether an 
entirely ad hoc test applied strictly by the courts can 
accommodate 3D printing to produce consistent results that align 
with the greater purposes of fair use and copyright law in 
general.427 Thus, this subpart first examines 3D printing under 
the current fair use doctrine. Next, it considers particularly 
pertinent criticisms of the established doctrine leveled by 
Professors Barton Beebe and Edward Lee. Finally, it posits that 
                                                                                                     
 424. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 551 (“This affirmative defense represents 
the most important—and amorphous—limitation on the otherwise 
extraordinarily broad rights granted to copyright owners under section 106 of 
the Act.”); Hanna, supra note 12 (“[T]hose accused of copyright infringement 
have some potent tools of their own, like invoking the DMCA safe harbor, and 
the defenses of fair use and innocent infringement.”).  
 425. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976) (“The statement of the fair use 
doctrine in section 107 offers some guidance to users in determining when the 
principles of the doctrine apply. However, the endless variety of situations and 
combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the 
formulation of exact rules in the statute.”). 
 426. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 563 (“[Justice Brennan’s dissent in 
Harper & Row] arguably set American courts on a course toward a rhetorically 
more mechanical treatment of the section 107 inquiry.”); Lee, supra note 7, at 
802 (referring to current doctrine as a “straitjacket”). 
 427. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 
(1984) (noting that copyright protection gives authors incentive to create, but 
that “[t]here are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforcement of this 
monopoly would inhibit the very ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’ that 
copyright is intended to promote” (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8)); id. at 
478 (“The fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works to be used for ‘socially 
laudable purposes.’”). 
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3D printing exemplifies the need for courts to implement 
Professor Lee’s separate technological fair use standard. 
1. 3D Printing Under the Current Doctrine 
Although fair use inquiries are ad hoc,428 an analysis of some 
examples of 3D printing under the current doctrine is a helpful 
starting point. First, it is safe to say that fair use would not apply 
to an infringement suit involving a CAD file depicting a 
copyrighted work downloaded in its entirety from a site such as 
Thingiverse. Using Napster as a guide, courts would likely find 
that under factor one,429 the CAD file was not transformative 
because “[c]ourts have been reluctant to find fair use when an 
original work is merely retransmitted in a different medium.”430 
Courts would likely find the transfer of the work from a two- or 
three-dimensional object to a virtual model to be more like a 
space-shift (no fair use)431 than a time-shift (fair use).432 While 
one might argue that changing an aesthetic work into a virtual 
model that serves the explicit function of a 3D-printing blueprint 
is transformative,433 courts would likely find that a change from 
the aesthetic to the functional—when that function is to make 
3D-printed copies of the aesthetic work—would not be a 
                                                                                                     
 428. See Lee, supra note 7, at 809 (“This ad hoc approach, while sensitive to 
the facts of each case, gives practically no guidance to the public on what 
constitutes permissible fair use.”). 
 429. See supra notes 160–82 and accompanying text (describing the 
transformative and commercial–noncommercial elements of the first factor—the 
nature and character of the use). 
 430. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 431. See UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that “space-shifting” from one format to another is 
not fair use because “this is simply another way of saying that the unauthorized 
copies are being retransmitted in another medium—an insufficient basis for any 
legitimate claim of transformation”). 
 432. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 423 
(1984) (determining that a VCR owner’s recording a program to watch at a later 
time constitutes fair use). 
 433. Cf. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 
2007) (“Although an image may have been created originally to serve an 
entertainment, aesthetic, or informative function, a search engine transforms 
the image into a pointer directing a user to a source of information.”). 
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transformative purpose.434 Furthermore, insofar as the Ninth 
Circuit defined “commercial use” in Napster to include “repeated 
and exploitative unauthorized copies of copyrighted works . . . to 
save the expense of purchasing authorized copies,”435 an 
individual who uploads a CAD file of a copyrighted work to 
Thingiverse, even if it is for free,436 is making a commercial use of 
the copyright. Concerning the second factor,437 unlike in Napster, 
in which the copyrighted works at issue were songs distributed on 
CD,438 the works in this hypothetical need not have been 
published. But use of a published work is more likely than use of 
an unpublished work to be fair use,439 so if anything, the CAD file 
in question is less likely to satisfy the second factor. In this case, 
the third factor440 weighs against fair use because the potentially 
infringing work has copied the copyrighted work in its entirety.441 
Finally, the court in Napster agreed with the district court’s 
findings that “Napster harms the market [for plaintiffs’ works] in 
‘at least’ two ways: it reduces audio CD sales among college 
                                                                                                     
 434. Cf. UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352 (determining that a 
conversion of music files from CD to MP3 for online storage and download is not 
sufficiently transformative for fair use purposes). 
 435. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015. 
 436. See id. (“Direct economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a 
commercial use. Rather, repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted works, 
even if the copies are not offered for sale, may constitute a commercial use.”). 
 437. See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
second factor—the nature of the copyrighted work—concerns whether the work 
is factual or creative and whether the work was published or unpublished). 
 438. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1010–11 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“Plaintiffs are engaged in the commercial recording, distribution and sale 
of copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings.”). 
 439. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(“Published works are more likely to qualify as fair use because the first 
appearance of the artist’s expression has already occurred.”). 
 440. See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text (describing the third 
factor—the amount of the protected work used compared to the protected work 
as a whole). 
 441. See Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 
1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000) (“While ‘wholesale copying does not preclude fair use 
per se,’ copying an entire work ‘militates against a finding of fair use.’” (quoting 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 
1986))); cases cited supra note 315 (averring that 3D-scanned CAD files are 
“mere copies” of the underlying work). 
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students and it ‘raises barriers to plaintiffs’ entry into the market 
for the digital downloading of music.’”442 Similarly, a CAD file 
exactly depicting a copyrighted work made available on 
Thingiverse would likely reduce sales of licensed copies of that 
work because people could 3D print versions for free in their own 
homes. Moreover, if the author of the copyrighted work wanted to 
make available a CAD file version to sell online, the infringing 
CAD file would make it more difficult to enter that market. 
Because CAD files that depict exact copies of copyrighted works 
and are made available for download on Thingiverse fail all four 
factors of the inquiry, courts would likely find them not to be fair 
use. 
More difficult cases would consist of CAD files that allegedly 
infringe on copyrighted works’ derivative works rights by altering 
the works or using them in remixes to create wholly new 
works.443 Although such CAD files would not appropriate the 
entire work, a fair use analysis would likely turn on whether 
courts found the files’ uses of the underlying works to be 
transformative.444 To constitute a transformative purpose, 
however, the CAD files would have to do more than merely “pay 
homage” to the underlying works; rather, they would have to 
serve a transformative purpose nearer to parody.445 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                     
 442. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016. 
 443. See Michael Weinberg, 3-D Printing Can Turbocharge Mashup Culture, 
HUFFPOST TECH (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-
weinberg/3d-printing-can-turbocharge_b_2578158.html?utm_hp_ref=technology 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Weinberg, Mashup Culture] (“Easy to 
use tools like meshmixer allow people to remix things just as easily as they 
remix songs or videos.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see 
also, e.g., Hurst, supra note 153 (describing a CAD file for an iPhone dock 
designed to look like the Iron Throne from HBO’s Game of Thrones television 
series). For discussion of how CAD files that alter the underlying work infringe 
on the author’s derivative works right, see supra notes 386–94 and 
accompanying text. 
 444. See infra note 452 and accompanying text (noting through statistics the 
importance that the first factor plays in fair use analysis). 
 445. See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 309 (2006) (arguing 
that musical mash-ups, fan fiction, and machinima (video clip mash-ups) are not 
sufficiently transformative to constitute fair use if they merely “pay homage” to 
the original works); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(determining that the defendant’s use of thumbnail versions of the plaintiff’s 
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under the fourth factor, copyright owners could assert that the 
CAD files infringe on their derivative work rights no matter how 
little of the underlying works the CAD files in question use.446 
Therefore, even in remix cases, courts may well find under the 
current doctrine that CAD files do not constitute fair use.447 
Although cases in which 3D printing appropriates a work in 
its entirety are clearly not fair use, the established fair use 
doctrine presents formidable challenges to potentially infringing 
works in less obvious cases. As currently construed, the 
definitions of “transformative” and “commercial use” in the first 
factor, and the ease with which a work can encroach on derivative 
markets in the fourth factor, will likely make findings of fair use 
rare in the 3D printing context. 
2. Criticisms of the Established Doctrine 
As courts have developed the fair use doctrine since its 
codification in the Copyright Act of 1976,448 a number of 
criticisms have emerged. Two such criticisms seem especially 
relevant in the context of 3D printing. First, in 2008, Professor 
Barton Beebe conducted an empirical study of all fair use 
appellate opinions between 1978—the year the Copyright Act 
went into effect—and 2005, which “show[s] that much of our 
                                                                                                     
photographs were sufficiently transformative because they served as indexing 
tools for a search engine instead of the aesthetic purpose of the originals). 
 446. See Lee, supra note 7, at 852 (“The major problem is the so-called 
circularity problem: the copyright holder can always claim an economic harm 
from an unlicensed use of its work, even in unformed markets or for unforeseen 
uses of a work.”); As 3-D Printing Becomes More Accessible, Copyright Questions 
Arise, supra note 39 (describing how one CAD designer has taken a popular 
CAD file of a Yoda bust and turned it into a vase—a use that would technically 
interfere with potential derivative markets). 
 447. See Weinberg, Mashup Culture, supra note 443 (“Sometimes, because of 
rules such as fair use, the creator [of a mash-up] does not need permission from 
the person who owns rights to the source material. Other times, mostly because 
the work falls outside of the scope of fair use, the creator does need 
permission.”). 
 448. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 563 (noting that after Justice Brennan’s 
dissent in Harper & Row, courts have treated the four factors in § 107 more 
mechanically). 
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conventional wisdom about our fair use case law, deduced as it 
has been from leading cases, is wrong.”449 Second, Professor 
Edward Lee argues that courts have been treating cases 
involving fair use and technology differently to the extent that 
such cases warrant “greater ex ante guidance.”450 Taken together, 
these two articles form the basis of this Note’s analysis of fair use 
in the 3D printing context. 
a. Professor Beebe’s Empirical Study 
For his study, Professor Beebe examined a total of 306 
opinions to determine “[w]hether these opinions have any 
influence on or are representative of the true state of our fair use 
doctrine as it is practiced in the courts.”451 Given the data, 
Beebe’s criticism focuses primarily on the first and fourth factors, 
which correlated with the outcome of the case 81.5% and 83.8% of 
the time, respectively.452 Regarding factor one, Beebe argues that 
the statutory language, which requires courts to consider “the 
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes,”453 has had little effect on courts’ application of the 
                                                                                                     
 449. Id. at 554. 
 450. Lee, supra note 7, at 802. 
 451. Beebe, supra note 154, at 553. 
 452. Id. at 584. Beebe found that the  
outcomes of factors one and four very strongly correlated with the test 
outcome and fairly strongly correlated with each other, while the 
outcome of factor two correlated weakly, if at all, with the outcome of 
the test and with the outcomes of the other factors. Factor three did 
better than factor two with respect to the overall test outcome, but 
the strength of its correlations with the outcomes of factors one and 
four was not impressive. 
Id. More specifically, Beebe found that 95.3% of the opinions finding that factor 
one disfavored fair use ultimately found no fair use, and 90.2% of the opinions 
finding that factor one favored fair use eventually found fair use. Id. at 597. In 
terms of the fourth factor, 140 of the 141 opinions that determined that factor 
four disfavored fair use found no fair use, and of the 116 opinions that weighed 
factor four in favor of fair use, 110 found fair use. Id. at 617. 
 453. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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factor compared to court-created subfactors.454 For example, even 
after the Supreme Court stressed the importance of 
transformativeness in Campbell,455 41.2% of the district court 
opinions since that decision have failed entirely to refer to it.456 
Instead, even though the Supreme Court rejected it in 
Campbell,457 courts are still relying on the “Sony presumption.”458 
Meanwhile, Beebe asserts that the fourth factor, despite 
supposedly being “undoubtedly the single most important 
element of fair use,”459 is actually “a metafactor under which 
courts integrate their analyses of the other three factors and, in 
doing so, arrive at the outcome not simply of the fourth factor, but 
of the overall test.”460 Instead of constituting an independent 
variable in the inquiry, the fourth factor serves as a forum for 
judges to conduct a “two-sided balancing test in which they weigh 
the strength of the defendant’s justification for its use, as that 
justification has been developed in the first three factors, against 
the impact of that use on the incentives of the plaintiff.”461 
The data, according to Beebe, show that the leading cases in 
fair use jurisprudence are fundamentally flawed. First, the cases 
“fail[] to accurately represent the actual state of our fair use 
doctrine as that doctrine is applied in the courts.”462 Second, their 
“method is flawed as a prescriptive enterprise in that it 
                                                                                                     
 454. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 597 (“To determine what motivated 
courts to declare that factor one favored or disfavored fair use, we need to look 
beneath the statutory language, which appears to have had only limited 
influence on the actual application of the factor, and evaluate how judges 
considered factor one’s various subfactors.”). 
 455. See supra notes 176–82 and accompanying text (describing the 
importance that the Court placed on transformativeness in Campbell).  
 456. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 604 (“At the district court level, 41.2% of 
the 119 district court opinions following Campbell failed even to refer to the 
doctrine, while 90.2% of the 92 opinions preceding Campbell failed to reference 
it . . . .”). 
 457. See id. at 602 (“This is good evidence of certain courts’ willful—or, at 
best, unknowing—use of the Sony presumption notwithstanding Campbell.”). 
 458. See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text (discussing the “Sony 
presumption”). 
 459. Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
 460. Beebe, supra note 154, at 617. 
 461. Id. at 621. 
 462. Id. 
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perpetuates—because it requires—the myth that nonleading 
cases follow the leading cases.”463 Finally, “courts tend to apply 
the factors mechanically and they sometimes make opportunistic 
uses of the conflicting precedent available to them.”464 Beebe 
concludes that such inconsistent applications of the doctrine “are 
systematic failures that require intervention.”465 
b. Professor Lee’s Technological Fair Use 
To address courts’ failures to consistently apply the fair use 
factors in cases involving technology, Professor Lee advances a 
separate test. Lee recognizes that the general case-by-case 
application of the four fair use factors “has its merits when fine 
tailoring is needed, but it does not preclude the possibility of 
identifying certain specific types of fair use.”466 Citing parody and 
reverse engineering as examples in which courts have granted 
“greater ex ante guidance to the public,”467 Lee argues that a 
separate standard468 is necessary in cases in which “the legality of 
the unauthorized uses of the copyrighted works decided, for all 
intents and purposes, not just the legality of the particular uses 
of the copyrighted works, but also the marketability of the 
technology itself.”469  
Lee models the technological fair use standard off of the four 
statutory factors and, accounting for Beebe’s findings that the 
                                                                                                     
 463. Id. at 622. 
 464. Id. 
 465. Id. 
 466. Lee, supra note 7, at 809. 
 467. Id. at 802. 
 468. See id. at 810–11 
By “technological fair use,” I mean to describe a category of fair use—
like parody fair use—that recurs with certain characteristics in 
different cases. In the case of parody fair use, the cases are defined by 
the person’s use of a copyrighted work to parody it. In the case of 
technological fair use, the use is for a new or value-adding purpose of 
creating, operating, or providing an output of a technology or 
application. 
 469. Id. at 808. 
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first and fourth factors dominate the inquiry,470 differentiates the 
new standard from the established doctrine through these two 
factors.471 Lee’s first factor is a four-part inquiry in which courts 
should question (1) whether the use of the copyrighted work is 
part of a new technology; (2) whether there is a reasonably 
perceivable public benefit from the technology; (3) whether the 
use is for creating, operating, or providing output of the 
technology (with creation weighing heaviest in favor of fair use 
and output least); and (4) whether the use is commercial, with 
significant weight given to commerciality only if the technology is 
offered at a high price.472 The second statutory factor—the nature 
of the copyrighted work—has less weight.473 The third factor—as 
does its statutory counterpart—asks courts to determine the 
amount or substantiality of the portion used relative to the 
copyrighted work but does so in light of the creation-operation-
output inquiry in the first factor.474 Finally, the fourth factor 
consists of three inquiries: (1) whether the use supersedes the 
object of the original copyright as a “market replacement”; 
(2) whether the technology at issue could have a positive effect on 
the market for the copyrighted work; and (3) whether a finding 
against fair use will affect the market for the technology in 
question.475 Thus, most significantly, the technological fair use 
                                                                                                     
 470. See id. at 835 (“If factor one usually determines or coincides with the 
outcome in practice, then it is important to tailor this factor with enough detail 
for courts to ask the right questions in technological fair use cases.”); supra Part 
VI.C.2.b (detailing Professor Beebe’s findings). 
 471. See id. (providing a table that lays out each of the factors under 
technological fair use, with factor one including a multipart analysis and factor 
four accounting for the effect on the market of the technology as well as on 
derivatives of the copyrighted work). 
 472. See id. (listing the factors on the table). 
 473. See id. at 850 (“If a technology has a transformative or value-adding 
purpose, . . . whether the works used are factual or fictional/artistic is a poor 
way to determine whether the technological use or technology should be 
allowed.”). 
 474. See id. at 851 (“[F]or technological fair use cases, the amount and 
substantiality of the work copied should be analyzed at the stage of use of the 
copyrighted work—whether during creation, operation, or output of the 
technology, with more leeway offered at the creation and operation stages than 
at the output stage.”). 
 475. See id. at 854 (setting out the subfactors for the fourth factor and 
noting that “[a] court should not ignore how a ruling against fair use in a 
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standard adds an explicit instruction to consider the public 
benefit in the first factor and asks courts to balance the harm to 
derivative markets for the copyrighted work against the benefits 
to the market for the technology in the fourth factor. 
3. 3D Printing Demonstrates the Need for Technological Fair Use 
Beebe’s and Lee’s articles demonstrate the ineffectiveness of 
current fair use doctrine in the technological setting. As shown 
below, the advent of 3D printing only exacerbates this inadequacy 
and reinforces the need for a separate technological fair use 
standard. Not only do Beebe’s data indicate that current fair use 
doctrine was for the most part not developed with technology in 
mind476 but 3D printing is a perfect example of a technology for 
which the courts should consider the public benefit and expand 
their considerations of market effects when rendering a fair use 
determination. Finally, 3D printing exemplifies how Lee’s 
technological fair use standard poses both a more nuanced and a 
more consistent option than the current doctrine.  
Although Congress had technological advances in mind when 
it crafted § 107 of the Copyright Act,477 the court-developed 
doctrine has evolved largely outside the technological context. As 
Professor Beebe points out, of the 306 opinions between 1978 and 
2005 included in his study, 52.9% involved exclusively nonvirtual 
print works.478 Additionally, between 1988 and 2005, only 21.6% 
of the opinions in the study concerned computer software works 
or the Internet.479 The relatively low number of technology-
centered fair use cases supports Professor Lee’s assertion that, 
                                                                                                     
technology case might negatively affect, if not destroy, an emerging market for a 
speech technology”). 
 476. See infra notes 478–81 and accompanying text (explaining how the data 
from Beebe’s study indicate that courts did not develop the current fair use 
doctrine while contemplating the particular issues posed by 3D printing or other 
new technologies).  
 477. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 559–60 (“[T]he main controversy 
surrounding the section’s perambulatory language, if not the fair use section as 
a whole, concerned an emergent technology of the time: photocopying.”). 
 478. Id. at 573. 
 479. Id. 
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especially in the technological context, “the overall number of fair 
use cases that provide even a modicum of certainty to the public 
with regard to future conduct is miniscule.”480 Another statistic 
that is especially relevant in the context of 3D printing: only 
15.6% of the opinions in Beebe’s study involved a shift in medium 
between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s works.481 The dearth 
of opinions dealing with shifting media suggests that fair use 
doctrine has not been tailored to deal with the complicated 
scenarios presented by 3D printing, in which potentially 
infringing CAD files turn physical works into virtual models, and 
3D printers turn those virtual models into potentially infringing 
physical objects. When one considers the small number of 
medium-shifting cases along with the small body of fair use case 
law concerning computer and Internet technology, it is not 
difficult to see how a doctrine that was not supposed to be “frozen 
in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological 
change”482 is instead applied too mechanistically483 to adequately 
address 3D printing issues.  
Professor Lee’s technological fair use standard is necessary 
especially in the context of 3D printing because its first factor 
requires courts to consider the potential public benefit of the 
technology at issue. Courts have long interpreted the Copyright 
Clause of the Constitution—“Congress shall have Power . . . To 
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
                                                                                                     
 480. Lee, supra note 7, at 802. This is not to say that no seminal fair use 
cases have involved technology. Sony, after all, was crucial because it both saved 
the fledgling VCR industry and created the “Sony presumption” that a 
commercial use was presumptively not fair use. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449, 456 (1984) (positing that “[i]f the 
Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, 
such use would presumptively be unfair” but that time-shifting for personal use 
constituted fair use). 
 481. See Beebe, supra note 154, at 573 (“Finally, 84.6% of the opinions 
addressed facts in which both parties’ works appeared in the same medium. 
Where a shift in medium did occur, the most common was from print to video or 
vice versa, which was reported in thirteen (or 4.2%) of the opinions.”). 
 482. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). 
 483. See Lee, supra note 7, at 802 (discussing how the courts “have 
misunderstood this broad authority to fashion and further develop the fair use 
doctrine as a straitjacket that permits only very fact-specific decisions applying, 
almost by rote, the four statutory fair use factors”). 
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limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries”484—to concern 
primarily the interests of the public.485 Fair use is one of the ways 
that courts have been able to prevent copyright protections from 
actually inhibiting its constitutional goals.486 But while courts 
have “frequently acknowledged that the section 107 test is 
illustrative rather than limitative . . . only 17% of the opinions [in 
Beebe’s study] explicitly considered one or more additional 
factors, and only 8.8% stated that the additional factor was 
relevant to the fair use determination.”487 Thus, most courts will 
likely fail to consider 3D printing’s numerous potential public 
benefits—including efficient and affordable home 
manufacturing488 and the broad dissemination of original 
designs489—thereby leading to fair use determinations 
inconsistent with those of courts that do. Without considering 
public benefit, courts risk fair use determinations that ultimately 
harm the progress of science through overprotection; with a 
                                                                                                     
 484. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 485. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“Like less 
ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, [parody] can provide social 
benefit . . . .”); Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither 
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private 
benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important 
public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the 
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special 
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius 
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired. 
 486. See Lee, supra note 7, at 838 (“[T]he fair use doctrine has always had 
an overriding goal of serving the public by acting as a First Amendment 
safeguard within copyright law and as a doctrine to promote the progress of 
science.”). 
 487. Beebe, supra note 154, at 564. 
 488. See Hanna, supra note 12 (“Broken dishwasher part? Download the 
relevant CAD file and print it out in plastic. While Amazon made trips to the 
store seem dated, 3D printing will make ordering (some) things online feel 
positively quaint.”); Lee, supra note 7, at 819–20 (discussing how technological 
fair use can serve not only to promote the progress of science (the realm of 
copyright) but also to promote the progress of the useful arts (the realm of 
patent law)). 
 489. See The Wired 3D Print-Off, supra note 26 (providing a public forum 
through a CAD contest for designers to display and share their original designs 
with other users). 
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novel, emerging technology like 3D printing, the potential danger 
of ignoring possible benefits is only magnified.490 
Similarly, the importance of Professor Lee’s additions to the 
fourth factor is apparent in the context of 3D printing. Rather 
than concentrate only on “the extent of market harm caused by 
the particular actions of the alleged infringer,”491 the 
technological fair use factor also considers “the technology’s 
possible positive effects on the potential market for the 
copyrighted work”492 and “the effect a finding against fair use 
would have on the market for the speech technology in 
question.”493 The first additional consideration recognizes that, as 
in Sony, the technology at issue might in fact benefit the very 
plaintiffs who attack it.494 The second “reminds courts of the need 
to avoid allowing copyrights to have a patent-like effect in 
controlling technologies.”495 Such considerations are necessary in 
a fair use analysis of 3D printing because the effects on the 
markets of copyrighted works are still so nebulous.496 While 3D 
printing’s effect on the markets could resemble the Ninth 
Circuit’s (realized) concerns in Napster,497 it could also spur those 
                                                                                                     
 490. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1387 (2004) 
(“Economic evidence strongly suggests that those unanticipated future benefits, 
or ‘spillover’ effects, often exceed the immediate value of most new 
technologies.”). 
 491. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (articulating 
courts’ interpretation of the fourth factor as considering only the negative effects 
of the infringing use on the market for the copyrighted work or its derivatives). 
 492. Lee, supra note 7, at 853. 
 493. Id. at 854. 
 494. See id. (“For example, the VCR opened up a new market for television 
shows and movies by facilitating a home rental and sale market. The technology 
was ‘complementary,’ in economic terms, to the copyrighted works.”). 
 495. Id. 
 496. Compare Hanna, supra note 12 (discussing the potential dangers to the 
markets of copyrighted works posed by 3D printing), with As 3-D Printing 
Becomes More Accessible, Copyright Questions Arise, supra note 39 (“People 
printing out copies of Tintin’s rocket were the company’s mega-fans, he says. 
Instead of attacking them, Weinberg adds, the company would have been better 
off selling digital designs to print out Tintin himself.”). 
 497. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“Napster harms the market in ‘at least’ two ways: it reduces audio CD sales 
among college students and it ‘raises barriers to plaintiffs’ entry into the market 
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markets by providing another channel through which copyright 
holders can disseminate their works.498 Furthermore, although it 
is currently impossible to conclusively determine,499 prohibiting 
individuals from freely downloading and printing copyrighted 3D 
objects might impair the market for home 3D printing. Although 
3D printers might still cut production costs for commercial 
manufacturers,500 and sites such as Shapeways might still print 
and ship individuals’ designs,501 the full potential of 3D printing 
to “democratize creation”502 could go unrealized.  
This does not mean that all 3D printing cases would pass the 
test; “[j]ust as some asserted parody fair uses may go too far and 
fall outside the exemption, so too some asserted technological fair 
uses may fail to qualify for the exemption.”503 The Thingiverse 
hypothetical above,504 for example, would likely not qualify as fair 
use under Professor Lee’s standard. The free availability of 
verbatim copies of copyrighted works would provide individuals 
with an alternative to buying the author’s works and would allow 
them to undermine the author’s efforts to market her works 
directly to those with 3D printers through her own CAD files.505 
This harm to the market of the copyrighted work would likely 
                                                                                                     
for digital downloading of music.’” (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2000))). 
 498. Cf. Steven A. Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and 
Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1888 n.77 (2009) (noting how copyright 
holders such as Joss Whedon support noncommercial fan fiction as a way to 
ensure that fans will “never be able to shake” their works). 
 499. See Depoorter, supra note 1, at 1842 (describing how until the effects of 
a new technology on the market are known, “both copyright owners and users of 
new technologies operate in a vacuum of considerable legal uncertainty”). 
 500. See Morrison, supra note 14 (explaining how 3D printing has “ramp[ed] 
up” manufacturing businesses). 
 501. See Made in the Future. Made for You, SHAPEWAYS, 
http://www.shapeways.com/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (offering to “[h]ave your 
designs delivered to your door”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 502. Hanna, supra note 12. 
 503. Lee, supra note 7, at 811. 
 504. See supra notes 428–42 and accompanying text (discussing how such a 
use would not qualify for fair use under the established doctrine). 
 505. Cf. supra note 497 (describing the effects that the Ninth Circuit feared 
that peer-to-peer file sharing would have on the music industry).  
680 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 591 (2014) 
still outweigh the public benefits of the technology and the harm 
to the 3D printing market absent a finding of fair use. Thus, 
courts should adopt the technological fair use standard not 
because it guarantees findings of fair use in all cases, but because 
it allows courts to reach dispositions that are both consistent and 
in accord with the purpose of copyright. 
Those gray areas in which findings of fair use would be 
unlikely under the current doctrine but more probable under 
technological fair use exist mainly in fan works and remixes. 
Most of the CAD files available on Thingiverse that reference 
copyrighted works are “faithful ‘fan’ copies of recognized 
works.”506 However, according to Professor Greg Lastowska, none 
of these works are transformative under the first fair use 
factor.507 While Professor Lastowska argues that many fan works 
and remixes could still qualify for fair use,508 it seems unlikely 
that courts would find fair use under the current doctrine when 
the works are not transformative and seem to, at least to some 
extent, encroach on the potential derivative markets of the 
copyrighted work.509 But this is where a technological fair use 
test could impact courts’ findings specifically in the context of 3D 
printing. While other remixes and fan works might fail to 
overcome nontransformativeness and commercial impact, the 
public benefit of 3D-printing technology (added in Professor Lee’s 
first factor analysis)510 and the danger to the viability of home 3D 
printing of a finding of no fair use (added in the Professor Lee’s 
                                                                                                     
  506. Greg Lastowska, The Player–Authors Project 61 (Nov. 30, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361758. 
 507. See id. (“None of the referential works were deemed to be 
transformative.”). 
 508. See id. at 34 (“There have been very few court opinions dealing with the 
phenomenon of non-commercial UGC fan works, and it is possible that all of the 
works described as “similar” could be protected as fair uses of the referenced 
works. However, it is hardly clear that this would be the case.”). Professor 
Lastowska’s study focuses on Internet user-generated content (UGC) in general, 
but 3D printing is one of the areas that it specifically examines. See id. at 59–62 
(focusing on Thingiverse). 
 509. See supra note 452 and accompanying text (explaining how Professor 
Beebe’s study indicated that the first and fourth fair use factors were most 
determinative of the court’s decision). 
 510. Supra note 472 and accompanying text. 
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fourth factor analysis)511 could be enough to tip the balance. 
Technological fair use is most likely to and should come into play 
in the context of 3D printing in the noncommercial fan works of 
the hobbyist and in the interest of fostering home 3D printing 
technology. 
VII. Conclusion 
As websites that make CAD files available for downloading 
continue to receive DMCA takedown notices, it is only a matter of 
time before a copyright holder sues a CAD designer, a website, or 
an individual hobbyist for infringement. In its current state, 
copyright law will likely struggle to handle claims involving these 
new types of works as it did with home video recording, MP3 
files, and peer-to-peer file sharing.512 This Note has proposed 
potential solutions for these looming problems. First, it has 
posited a composite test for the copyrightability of CAD files that 
accounts for the functional interaction between their design 
drawing and computer code components by addressing each 
component separately and conducting a merger inquiry. Next, 
this Note has applied the composite test to the complex network 
of potentially derivative works in 3D printing. Finally, it has 
asserted that courts should adopt Professor Lee’s technological 
fair use standard given the problems that 3D printing poses for 
the current doctrine. Equipped with such tools, courts will 
hopefully establish a copyright jurisprudence for 3D printing that 
will both protect the rights of copyright owners and allow the 
technology to grow—to “democratize creation”513 rather than 
stifle it. 
  
                                                                                                     
 511. Supra note 475 and accompanying text. 
 512. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text (describing the delay 
between the emergence of new technologies and legislation or legal decisions 
resolving copyright issues surrounding that new technology).  
 513. Hanna, supra note 12. 
